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ABSTRACT 
This research focused on levels of trust, participation levels, and the emergence of 
polycentric governance among buffer zone community stakeholders in a case study of La 
Amistad International Park in Costa Rica and Panama. In this investigation, I combined a 
human geography of regions perspective with Common Pool Resource (CPR) theory to 
analyze the management structure of a bi-national park (a UNESCO Biosphere and World 
Heritage Site) and its progress toward the UNESCO Biosphere goals. These goals focus on 
socio-economic development for human well-being and educational and research 
opportunities addressing global to local issues related to integrated conservation and 
development. I analyzed the trust factor from Elinor Ostrom’s resource user conditions and 
two of Ostrom’s eight institutional arrangements for CPR success: (1) collective-choice 
arrangements and (2) multiple layers of governance. These elements lead to a clearer 
understanding of the current institutional arrangements in the park. I conducted an 
exploratory case study using a qualitative, mixed-methods approach consisting of semi-
structured interviews, questionnaires, and observation. This project showed how the global 
and local forces have produced the present structure of management with fortress 
conservation practices at varying degrees in the four regions. Additionally, this research 
demonstrated how the community member’s trust in stakeholder and governmental 
conservation efforts drops with lower levels of collective action. There have been many 
international measures such as the Park in Perils Program and the UNESCO Biosphere with 
the idea of greater stakeholder involvement; however the efforts and results of these efforts 
vary greatly across the four regions with some success on the Pacific side of the park and 
little to none on the Atlantic side.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO A CASE STUDY ON LA AMISTAD 
INTERNATIONAL PARK  
 
 Translated as the “International Friendship Park” in English, Parque Internacional La 
Amistad (PILA) is a transboundary-protected area spanning the border of Costa Rica and 
Panama.  The Park’s name obscures more than it reveals.  This park is the largest nature 
reserve in Central America and protects a biogeography of 1,403,176 acres and some of 
Mesoamerica’s most iconic megafauna, the Jaguar, Tapir, and Harpy Eagle. Beyond the 
veneer of friendship, lies conflict. Like most protected areas in developing countries, PILA is 
also home to many conflicts and tensions. Tensions exist among stakeholders from the local 
to the global, conflict and tension also populates this park’s human and political geography 
levels because of the diverse interests involved. Tensions have arisen because of the different 
goals of forest conservation, hydroelectric development, and the local communities. The 
pursuit of diverse agendas is leading to distrust among stakeholders in the buffer zone 
communities of La Amistad. Studies have demonstrated that the loss of ecosystem services, 
which can result from hydroelectric development, can disproportionately burden poor 
communities dependent on these ecosystem services. Conversely, conservation measures 
such as the creation of protected areas to prevent further land conversion to agriculture or 
extraction activities have often led to unfavorable outcomes for poorer communities 
(Brandon et al., 2005). Expansion in local stakeholder involvement and improvements in 
protected area management practices are recommended to reconcile these diverse interests.   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Thesis Goals and Objectives  
 
 This is a research investigation for a Master’s Thesis in Geography that navigates the 
intersection of biogeography and the political strain of human geography. In this research, I 
start with the human geography concept that regions are not static (Thrift, 1994), but are a 
constructive process with continuous reconstruction by anthropogenic forces. Humans play a 
significant role in the success or failure of conservation of eco-regions. By looking at regions 
of conservation from a biogeography perspective, the dominant narrative of scientists and 
ecologists is that single large areas support more biodiversity than several small areas 
(MacArthur &Wilson, 1967). However, the idea of SLOSS (the dilemma of single large or 
several small) focused solely on the biodiversity component. My research went further and 
investigated the political side of the conservation practices of a region. I extend the 
perspective presented by Abel et al. (2011) in a transboundary conservation and management 
study that examined the parallels between the conservation dilemma of SLOSS in island 
biogeography and the debate about a centralized management approach versus the 
polycentric approach introduced by Elinor Ostrom is her Common Pool Resource Theory 
(CPR).  
 My research brings together the theories of Thrift, MacArthur & Wilson and Ostrom, 
allowing for the spatialization of Common Pool Resource Theory to help reveal some of the 
complications when dealing with large geographic scales and a broad range of interested 
parties. By integrating these three perspectives, I collected a unique combination of data to 
examine the conservation geography dilemmas surrounding the management of La Amistad. 
The methodological approach that bridges these theories involved a case study analysis of: 
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(1) levels of trust; (2) collective-choice arrangements; and (3) multiple layers of governance 
(polycentric) in a bi-national park. The importance of trust in dealing with collective-action 
dilemmas is becoming a focus in recent theoretical research (Ostrom, 2009). For instance, 
according to Poteet, Janssen and Ostrom (2010) “…at the core of an evolving theoretical 
explanation of successful or unsuccessful collective action is the internal link between trust 
among participants in a common pool setting…and the increased probability that all 
participants will use reciprocity norms”.  
 Poteet, Janssen and Ostrom (2010), define a case study as having multiple levels of 
analysis with separate units of analysis. The principle units of analysis for a commons is 
defined as the participants involved in collective action or the “central objects” of the 
collective action.  The specific types of cases can be defined as cases of a natural resource 
system, a policy unit, or a social group (Poteet, Janssen and Ostrom, 2010).  My research 
explores these three multiple layers of analysis.  
 The latter two analysis techniques are institutional guidelines in Ostrom’s CPR 
Theory and are found in the guidelines of UNESCO Biosphere Reserves. By comparing the 
levels of trust, collective-choice arrangements, and polycentric governance across the four 
provincial regions that form La Amistad International Park, my research identified significant 
tensions and complications that arise among resource users and outside interests relative to 
the conservation of a large-scale natural resource. 
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Politicized Biogeography 
 
 Arriving in the community of Guadalupe on the Pacific side of La Amistad 
International Park in Panama in January 2011, I encountered a community meeting to rally 
residents against the installation of multiple hydroelectric projects in the region.  
In the following quote, I do not identify my interviewee and instead use an abbreviation for a 
Panamanian Pacific resident (PaP). From personal interviews and observations, tension 
between the foreign hydroelectric company pursuits in the area and the interests of the local 
community members became evident: 
 “…All of the hydroelectrics are from Spain. Someone sold them to a 
Panamanian electricity company and now they are making money and now 
they want to make more and it’s foolish because now the river is going to 
die sooner or later… You are on top of a bomb right now.” (PaP, 42)  
 
 As asserted by a long-time resident of Guadalupe, a community bordering La 
Amistad International Park and located within the La Amistad Biosphere (which includes 
critical areas adjacent to the park), this “bomb” symbolizes the growing tension in the 
Chiriqui and Bocas del Toro Provinces of Panama concerning the numerous hydroelectric 
plants proposed for these areas. Because of the agrarian-based economy of the Chiriqui 
Province, which produces a large portion of the food for the Republic of Panama, numerous 
residents of the La Amistad buffer zone communities of Guadalupe, Cerro Punta and Las 
Nubes have expressed concern over water rights, flooding, deforestation, and the 
government’s favoring international economic interests over local interests.  
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The hydroelectric issue has led to community rallies by the Panamanian NGO, 
FUNDICCEP, Fundación para el desarrollo integral, comunitario y conservación de los 
ecosistemas en Panama (Foundation for the Integral Development, Community and 
Conservation of Ecosystems in Panama), participation in the Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission in Washington DC in 2008 by members of the Naso and Ngobe indigenous 
groups, and tension among Naso community members regarding the installation of 
hydroelectric facilities. This dilemma has two sets of tensions in play; (1) the hydroelectric 
development with its economic benefits versus the interests of residents who will be 
adversely affected in areas like agriculture, and (2) and the disconnect between conception 
and implementation of conservation measures in La Amistad International Park.   
 This hydroelectric dilemma reflects some of the tensions that exist specifically in the 
region of La Amistad and also sheds light on the international conservation debate. It is not 
simply about the environment per se, as there are social and political processes that underlie 
the different conservation approached embraced across the park. There is an ongoing 
conservation debate between the protectionist paradigm, which focuses on the protection of 
biodiversity through a centralized authoritarian regime, versus the more participatory, 
integrated approach with community involvement (Wilshusen et al., 2002). Many parks were 
created with the island biogeography idea of biologically “single large” fused with politically 
“single large” (centralized management). However, according to studies conducted by Elinor 
Ostrom, polycentric governance can lead to more successful outcomes in commons 
management. This conservation debate is even more complicated in a park such as La 
Amistad due to the enormous spatial extent of the Park. Owing to the bi-national and bi-
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regional governance, the political geography of the park drastically changes throughout the 
four geographic regions.  
To better understand the political biogeography of La Amistad International Park, l 
investigated the different governing assemblages, stakeholder perceptions of them, how they 
interact, and how these relationships plays out practically in the management of the park. As 
Nigel Thrift explains, a decent regional geographic approach can be found if we understand 
that regions are not bound, but constructed (Thrift, 1994). My analysis of the governing, 
cross-scale assemblages elucidates the governance structure of the park and the intricacies of 
governing a commons with a large spatial extent.   
Management and planning of specific regions, such as La Amistad International Park, 
are not always situated in the same geographic location nor in the park itself. Many times the 
decisions are made or influenced from elsewhere and by a variety of actors. As John Allen 
and Allan Cochrane discuss, regions can be seen as a relational construct or an assemblage of 
political actors rather than a fixed geographic place (Allen & Cochrane, 2007). Using these 
ideas, the present approach attempts to identity the various stakeholders and decision-makers, 
whether located at the particular geographic site or in the capital of each nation.  
The observations I make about park management incorporate perceptions and 
experiences of community members, their knowledge of the park, and the level of 
participation of buffer zone community members in forest management. Financial 
encouragement for sustainable economic alternatives in the buffer region comes from 
powerful NGOs and multi-national companies, which have influence on certain buffer zone 
regions. Restrictions on the activities of buffer zone communities emerge from authoritative 
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rule and corresponding low levels of participation. These limitations are analyzed by 
considering cross-scale assemblages studying who is included and excluded in park 
activities. Is decision-making power in park management wielded by local communities or 
local researchers due to their knowledge of the area? Or does power in park decision-making 
rest in the hands of international conservation groups? Or do the governments of one or both 
countries maintain power? Another controlling factor is the geographic region that was 
designated park territory, with the rules and regulations that were implemented in the region 
and rationale behind these rules and regulations.  These questions are overlooked in the 
dominant boundary making of conservation regions through the field of biogeography.  
  
Significance in Biogeography  
 When discussing island biogeography, the focus is on the biological isolation that 
confronts species in an insulated geographic region (Quammen, 1996). The geographic island 
is tangible and visible. Whether we view it as synthetic barriers such as fences, roads, farms, 
or as natural limits such as oceans and rivers, we observe the abrupt transition from densely 
forested terrain to other forms of land use. The biology that defines an island is only one 
factor as many times these biological islands are human constructs. These constructs can be 
both a social and political act, thus the politics are a consideration in this research. According 
to Donaldson and Murakami (2007) “biogeography has traditionally focused on the 
distribution of organisms over space and time, political biogeography should concentrate on 
the mutual interference of human and on human systems in this distribution.” The political 
management of the region impacts and alters the landscape. I examine the unique and diverse 
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political management schemes throughout La Amistad International Park through the 
intersection of spatial implications from island biogeography and the management 
components of Common Pool Resource Theory. 
 In addition to the political management, I analyze perceptions and experiences of 
park conservation by local community members and NGO workers in various communities 
in the buffer zone. This research demonstrates the community’s horizontal collaborations and 
interconnections with the traditional vertical management regime and examines the levels of 
trust among the stakeholders. 
 
La Amistad International Park  
Spanning the Talamanca Mountain Ranges in southern Costa Rica and northern 
Panama, the unique geographical and biological landscape is part of the Mesoamerican 
Biological Corridor and contains one of the largest and most biodiverse tracts of undisturbed 
forest remaining in Central America. With the goal of conserving the exceptional 
biodiversity in this region, Costa Rica and Panama created a bi-national park in 1990, La 
Amistad International Park. The initial management approach of both countries followed the 
conventional “fences-and-fines” structure for protected area management, which assigns park 
authority to the central government of each country. The creation of La Amistad occurred 
before the 1995 restructuring and decentralization of the park system in Costa Rica, moving 
from the centralized National Park Service to the distributed National System of 
Conservation Areas (Evans, 1999).  
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Figure I: La Amistad International Park Boundaries 
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Following this decentralization in protected areas management to eleven regional 
ministries in Costa Rica in 1995 (Evans, 1999) and, building on the creation of La Amistad 
National Park in 1982 and the UNESCO World Heritage Site designation in 1983, the 
management of the park moved toward a more decentralized and inclusive form of 
management. With the union of this transborder ecological region under joint management, 
the Panamanian and Costa Rican governments created an international park, which received 
the UNESCO World Heritage designation in 1990 (UNESCO 1990). La Amistad 
International Park was designated a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve in 2000 (UNESCO, 2000). 
On the Costa Rican side of the Park, the Biosphere designation, combined with the 
decentralization to conservation areas in 1995, was a step toward a more localized approach. 
Global involvement simultaneously increased with the addition of the Biosphere objectives 
of community involvement and a jointly managed international park.  On the Panamanian 
side, in 1998 the management of protected areas was structured into a similar system of 
protected areas with a centralized government authority, the National Environment Authority 
(ANAM). 
The creation of La Amistad on both sides of the international border embodied = 
Garrett Hardin’s (1968) recommendation of privatization or state control to prevent the 
demise of the commons; in the case of La Amistad the form of management originated with 
state control. Common pool resources (CPRs) are shared commodities that can be either a 
natural resource such as forest, fishery, and pasture or human-made such as an irrigation 
system. It is costly, but not impossible, to exclude beneficiaries from common pool 
resources. CPRs can be diminished due to problems of overuse with a lack of regulation, as 
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with the situation with open access (Ostrom et al, 2002). Forests, as a common pool resource, 
may be owned and managed by numerous institutional entities such as various levels of 
government (local, regional, national), communal groups, private goods of individuals or 
corporations, or left unmanaged with open access to anyone. La Amistad involves a mixed 
institutional approach, with differences due to the division of La Amistad into four separate 
management zones with further divisions for indigenous reserves. While Table I below, 
adapted from Balloffet and Martin (2007) shows clear among four management types, the 
management of La Amistad is a mixture of these various types.  
While much of the forest area includes governmentally purchased land, there is 
indigenous territory on the Caribbean side of the park in Panama and Costa Rica that is 
private land. There is not currently “recognition of full private or traditional rights”. The 
indigenous territories carry out the conservation laws set by the Costa Rican and Panamanian 
governmental authorities. In the Pacific regions of the park in both Costa Rica and Panama 
there is some sense of “co-responsibility”. In the Pacific region of Costa Rica local 
associations take part in some formal participatory measures, though co-responsibility does 
not equate to shared governance or co-management as defined in Type II. According to 
Singleton (1998) co-management is “the term given to governance systems that combine 
state control with local, decentralized decision making and accountability and which, ideally, 
combine the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses of each.” 
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Table I: Governance Types for Protected Areas (Adapted from Balloffet and Martin, 
2007) 
 Within CPR Theory, trust in management outcomes would most likely increase 
moving from Type I to Type IV, as these conditions are thought to foster more effective CPR 
management. In the case of La Amistad, the management outcomes are not as 
straightforward as the chart above indicates. Additionally, the levels of trust in the 
indigenous reserves, in particular, do not follow the predictions of CPR Theory.  
Even a decade after the establishment of La Amistad, the forest remained vulnerable 
to illegal occupation, cattle ranching, timber extraction, slashing and burning and 
Type I 
Governance by State Authority and responsibility given to sub national to federal governmental bodies •  Regulate, enforce and mediate offenses •  Decision‐making  
Type II 
Governance Shared: Authority and responsibility shared among governmental bodies and other involved parties •  Consultation and bene]it sharing •  Decision‐making and collaborative agreements 
Type III & IV 
Private Governance and Community Governance: Authority and responsibility through ownership or communities with historical rights •  Formally shared •  Managerial involvement •  Acknowledgement of private or traditional rights 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development (UNESCO, 1990). Some of these activities extend beyond designated areas due 
to encroachment of cattle ranchers from buffer zones. The outcome is deforestation in La 
Amistad Park territory stemming from inadequate management and governance. As 
described by Hardin, a common pool resource left unregulated results in the total depletion of 
that resource because stakeholders are locked into a competition for the resource with no 
incentives to conserve. Furthermore, Hardin states, “we must soon cease to treat the parks as 
commons or they will be of no value to anyone.” (Hardin, 1968)  
More recent studies have revealed that common pool resources are not always subject 
to total destruction if community norms, rules and enforcement through adequate 
governmental regulation are present (Schlager, 2004). In the case of La Amistad, clearly 
defined objectives for management, as well as the establishment of collaborative efforts from 
the local to global scale have started to emerge in recent years. The extent of these 
collaborative efforts varies across the four regions of the park as shown in Table II below. 
While there are formal methods of assessment with selective stakeholder participation on the 
Pacific of Costa Rica and Panama, co-management has not emerged. However, there is an 
ongoing process to create co-management in the Caribbean region of Costa Rica between the 
indigenous groups and MINAE, Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía (Ministry of the 
Environment and Energy).  
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Table II: Extent of Collaboration Across La Amistad 
 
Research Questions  
The creation of this transborder arrangement emerged to ensure improved 
collaborative management of the transboundary eco-region shared by both Panama and Costa 
Rica. This is a study of tensions in transborder collaborative park management that addresses 
how are diverse, local-to-global scale pressures reshaping the management of La Amistad 
International Park and how does this affect levels of trust, participation and the emergence of 
polycentric governance between the local communities and the park? This involves an 
examination of institutional structures and governance. Who is involved in managing which 
space in and around the park, from where, and to what extent? Which stakeholders are 
included in this governance regime and which are excluded? Is there a uniform management 
structure throughout the four regions of the park? And how do the perceptions and 
experiences in the buffer zone communities of La Amistad differ bi-regionally and bi-
nationally?   
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UNESCO and La Amistad  
           
 With a United Nation’s Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization’s 
(UNESCO) Biosphere and World Heritage Site designation, the contentious issue 
surrounding the construction of hydroelectric facilities within the La Amistad Biosphere 
draws attention to the management regime and where the decision-making resides in La 
Amistad International Park. This issue further spurs questions regarding community 
perceptions, levels of stakeholder participation, collaboration and meaningful involvement of 
community stakeholders in the governing scheme, levels of trust between stakeholders in the 
buffer zone of La Amistad International Park and the similar and different perceptions among 
stakeholders throughout the four geographical regions of this bi-national park.  
 In accordance with the UNESCO World Heritage Site designation as a “natural” site, 
there are specific criteria and implications for the preservation of the unique biodiversity that 
is found in La Amistad. In this research, I focus my attention on the objectives set forth by 
the UNESCO Biosphere designation that relate directly to achieving the interrelated goals of 
conservation, sustainable development, and logistical support. Is the goal of sustainable 
development being cultivated locally with community member involvement in participative 
governance systems and how does it vary across the four regions of park management? Or, as 
observed by Weber, Lovrich and Gaffney (2005), how much collaborative capacity do 
communities and NGOs in the buffer zone of La Amistad have to actively integrate and 
partake in the policy and decision-making arena of traditional, vertical governing 
institutions? Additionally, my research investigates whether there is development toward a 
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multi-stakeholder approach with community member involvement in management as set 
forth in the Biosphere Reserve guidelines. I approach this through an analysis of whether the 
park management subscribes to two of Elinor Ostrom’s eight institutional prescriptions for 
common rool resource management: (1) collective-choice arrangements and (2) multiple 
layers of governance.  
 By focusing my research on an analysis of governing assemblages involved in 
ecosystem management in a case study of conservation and management efforts in La 
Amistad International Park in Costa Rica and Panama, this project will demonstrate how 
global and local forces have produced the present structure of governance at various 
sociopolitical and geographic scales and also will reveal some of the differences that have 
formed bi-regionally and bi-nationally.  The unique balance between the incorporation of 
outside knowledge, support and investment versus local customs, traditions and economic 
vitality has created a diverse political landscape and different sets of challenges for park 
officials, NGOs and community stakeholders. 
 
Resource Conservation and Management Implications   
La Amistad has been involved in the Parks in Peril Program (PiP) since 1995 through 
the Nature Conservancy, which is closely associated and shares common objectives with the 
UNESCO Biosphere Reserve designation. As stated by the Parks in Peril Program, 
“protected areas governance incorporates both biodiversity and social concerns by addressing 
the what, why, how and by whom of protected areas management.” One communal focus in 
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the published literature of these two programs involves the idea of “governance, 
participation, equity and benefit sharing” through involvement of indigenous and local 
communities (Balloffet and Martin, 2007). Therefore, the level of local participation and the 
extent of the emergence of a co-management regime confirm whether these UNESCO and 
the Nature Conservancy goals are being carried out. This is similar to Weber’s (2005) 
approach to collaborative capacity that looks at the integration of horizontal, vertical and 
partnership linkages. 
By looking at levels of trust, local participation and polycentrism, my research 
critically analyzes the efforts of the Parks in Peril Program in the Talamanca Range and their 
conservation approach of consolidation. PiP (2008) states that they are “working with local 
stakeholders to consolidate the Amistad International Park/Bocas del Toro area by 
identifying critical targets and stresses through Conservation Area Planning.” Brandon, 
Redford and Sanderson (1998) provide nine case studies of National Parks in Latin American 
concluding that, “burdening the parks with an overwhelming set of social goals has become 
all too commonplace.” In contrast, Wilshusen et al. (2002) favors community development 
projects and the promotion for community participation in the decision-making process, and 
criticizes the necessity of fortress conservation for the protection of biodiversity. Their 
critique is multi-faceted, including the ideas that fortress conservation ignores the social and 
political processes involved in conservation, and fails to recognize pre-existing land rights as 
well as indigenous and traditional approaches to conservation. 
Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRNM) has had successes 
and challenges as a method to achieve sustainability where communities and protected 
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ecosystems converge. As demonstrated in many case studies by Elinor Ostrom, there have 
been documented success stories that contrast with the top-down, command-and-control, 
centralized management of natural resources around the world. Costa Rica’s record on 
CBNRNM is a mixed story of successes and struggles, but in cases such as Cahuita National 
Park, located in the La Amistad Biosphere, progress toward more community involvement 
with a co-management system has emerged, (CRC, 77).  
My research on La Amistad joins a growing body of work on transboundary policy 
challenges. Two nations managing a conservation area jointly requires a balance of 
international influences (financial, scientific knowledge) combined with consideration of 
local rights and local autonomy within the integrated development approach of the UNESCO 
Biosphere Reserve Program. This project demonstrates how global and local (glocal) forces 
have produced the present management structure at multiple sociopolitical and geographic 
scales in La Amistad International Park. This variance comes in the form of management 
diversity that has emerged bi-regionally and bi-nationally to govern this immense eco-region. 
 
Thesis Overview  
Chapter 2 (Political Geographies and Conservation Regions) includes a historical 
overview of the park systems in both Costa Rica and Panama, followed by a literature review 
addressing various conservation approaches. The political side of conservation is discussed 
through the theoretical approach of Common Pool Resource Theory. The complexities of the 
resource system in this study are also touched upon through a discussion of “glocalization”, 
as there are many layers of influence, from global to local, in the management of La 
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Amistad. Chapter 3 (Research Methods) discusses the chosen research methods of a case 
study approach and the rationale behind these methods. Specific implementations of both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches are used in this research. Chapter 4 (Historical 
Background and Public Perceptions of La Amistad) looks at the creation of La Amistad and 
the current challenges in the park. Trust, a characteristic of resource users, discussed by 
Elinor Ostrom, is analyzed across the four regions of La Amistad. In Chapter 5 (Interview 
and Survey Results), both collective-choice arrangements and polycentric governance are 
assessed for four regions of the park. Finally, Chapter 6 (Conclusions) discusses the 
conclusions regarding trust, collective-choice arrangements, and polycentric governance. 
Research limitations and potential for future research are included.  
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CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL GEOGRAPHIES AND CONSERVATION 
REGIONS  
 
 MesoAmerica is a not only a geographic and cultural region, but is recognized by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as an economic region. 
MesoAmerica consists of seven Central American countries (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama) and southeastern portions of Mexico. Other 
regional concepts include the creation of parks like La Amistad, which is a constructed eco-
region. There are also strategies such as the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor used to create 
links between eco-regions such as La Amistad International Park to form continuous 
landscapes through which wildlife can migrate freely. These various ideas of regions are all 
human-made constructs, which is important in understanding the complex and dynamic 
nature of an eco-region like La Amistad. 
  
Construction of Regions  
According to Ghimire and Pimbert (1997) the creation of parks is not solely for the 
purpose of the protection of nature, rather parks act as “social spaces”. This follows Nigel 
Thrift’s (1994) assertion that regions are not bound, but constructed, and “actors and 
organizations involved in the territorialization of space may act both inside and outside 
regions” (Paasi, 2002). According to former Costa Rican President Carazo (1978-82) the 
parks of Costa Rica are “splendid natural laboratories which we offer to the international 
scientific community, and also to children, young people and adults who should not be 
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denied the joy of direct contact with nature in its pristine state” (cited in Campbell, 2002). La 
Amistad International Park was not solely created as a conservation strategy, but also a social 
and political creation, an imposition of a natural protected area by both the Panamanian and 
Costa Rican governments without the full consent of many of the communities that lived in 
the regions and adjacent communities.  
The sociopolitical and geographic scales are of great relevance for this particular 
commons research. As Paasi (2002) asserted, “Regions, their boundaries, symbols and 
institutions are hence not results of autonomous and evolutionary processes but expressions 
of a perpetual struggle over the meaning associated with space, representation, democracy 
and welfare.” This project demonstrates the importance of geographic spatial implications 
and how global and local (glocal) forces have produced the present structure of management 
at various sociopolitical and geographic scales in La Amistad International Park. The single 
large or several small (SLOSS) debate was the first dominating geographic construction that 
greatly influenced the creation of conservation regions. 
 
SLOSS and Island Biogeography  
 In addition to managerial and regulatory oversight of natural resources (e.g., forests), 
for an ecosystem to flourish and maintain biodiversity, it is necessary to consider the dangers 
of fragmenting an ecosystem and the importance of a clearly designated eco-region. Defining 
and/or regulating conservation boundaries through natural eco-regions rather than political 
boundaries can accomplish this goal. The park area that now extends across the Costa Rican-
Panama border, La Amistad International Park, encompasses a greater eco-region than the 
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original La Amistad National Park in Costa Rica, with some 1.2 million hectares total, more 
than doubling the size of the original national park of 584,000 hectares (Carbonell, 2007). 
This expansion conserves a larger area, allowing for biodiversity to thrive and transcend 
political borders.  
 The major ecological importance of expansion of park conservation areas, rather than 
fragmentation of the park, is demonstrated through island biogeography studies conducted by 
MacArthur and Wilson. They showed the negative implications of “an island surrounded by a 
“sea” of open country in which forest species cannot live” (Quammen, 1996). MacArthur and 
Wilson’s 1967 publication, “Theory of Island Biogeography” included the ideas that (1) 
larger biological habitats can support more biodiversity and (2) greater levels of habitat 
isolation lead to less biodiversity. Further research by Jared Diamond (1975) presented 
findings regarding the emerging SLOSS debate, which questions whether ecosystem habitat 
could thrive better as single large or several small. Diamond found that larger stretches of 
protected areas were able to support more biodiversity. Wilcox and Murphy go beyond the 
SLOSS debate and the islands, whether small or large. They focus on the process of habitat 
fragmentation and how the two aspects, loss of habitat and isolation, lead to deterioration of 
biodiversity (Wilcox & Murphy, 1985). These researchers were influential in the 
construction, both socially and physically, of conservation regions.  
 My research does not examine the biological isolation addressed by island 
biogeography. Another angle from which to examine the SLOSS debate is through social 
science research by looking at the resource management dilemma of single large or several 
small. As addressed by Abel et al. (2011), Elinor Ostrom’s theory of Common Pool Resource 
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paralleled the biogeography SLOSS debate in the 1960s. In looking at two case studies, the 
public administration of water delivery and the police force in California, Ostrom found that 
multiple axes of governance, termed polycentric forms of governance, were more effective 
than centralized governance. Following this study Ostrom identified many successful 
alternatives to centralized governance regimes.  The idea of multiple layers of governance, 
both polycentric and participatory, in a bi-national park is found in the guidelines of 
UNESCO Biosphere Reserves, a designation La Amistad International Park currently holds.  
 The studies conducted by MacArthur, Wilson, Diamond, Wilcox and Murphy, among 
others, illustrate the biological importance of avoiding fragmentation. The biological region 
that straddles the Costa Rica-Panama international border is established, but much depends 
on the successful collaboration of not only governmental institutions, but local community 
stakeholders and local NGOs for successful conservation management of this transborder 
eco-region (part of an even greater eco-region project, the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor 
Project). My research attempts to illuminate the complex governance networks and power 
structures involved in the management of such an extensive international territory. By 
analyzing the complexities of these governing networks, I identify the limits on the 
involvement and impact of the participating stakeholders due to the large scale of La 
Amistad. To promote biodiversity, larger territories are very beneficial.  Governing larger 
conservation areas, especially with political borders, creates an elaborate, multi-directional 
and multi-dimensional power structure, spanning the scales from local knowledge to 
international financial influences.  
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Tragedy of the Commons and Emergence of CPR Theory 
 
There are various theories to understand common pool resource dilemmas. Forests, 
for example, are a common resource. As Hardin observed in his herder example, when a 
common resource is left unregulated, this locks the resource users into a competition for the 
resource, leaving no incentives to conserve and eventually leading to the total depletion of 
the resource. “Cooperative behavior with other participants exposes oneself to terrible 
exploitation, but the choice and the outcome are incontrovertible; act narrowly self-interested 
and achieve an outcome in which all are made worse off,” which represent Hardin’s concept 
of “Tragedy of the Commons”(Hardin, 1968). Garrett Hardin’s tragedy of the commons 
emerged following the publication of Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action in which 
“unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or 
some other special device to make individuals act in their common interests, rational self-
interested individuals will not act to achieve the common or group interest”(Schlagar, 2004).  
 Recent studies have shown that common pool resources do not always end in the total 
destruction of the resource when community norms, rules and enforcement through 
government regulation are brought to bear. The Common Pool Resource Theory developed 
by Elinor Ostrom shows that there are three related issues that need to be worked through: 
supply, credible commitment, and mutual monitoring.  If dealt with in the correct manner, it 
is possible to find a resolution to many environmental problems that arise from poor resource 
governance (Ostrom, 1990).  
Some of the characteristics of the resource environment that Ostrom describes for the 
success of common resource governance include feasible improvements; resources not 
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already overly deteriorated; the need for reliable, frequent economic indicators; predictability 
– the ability to predict resource flow; and spatial extent, with boundaries that are not too 
extensive and difficult to monitor (Dietz, Ostrom & Stern, 2003). 
 Referring to the characteristics of the parties involved, also known as group or 
individual characteristics, collective action will most likely emerge when there exists 
salience- the appropriator’s livelihood depends on the resource; common understanding and 
knowledge of the resource system; a low discount relating to future benefits; trust that others 
will maintain promises; autonomy, or the ability to determine the rules the appropriators will 
adhere to without need of external intervention; and organizational and local leadership 
experience (Ostrom, 1990).  
 Of these group and individual characteristics, my research identifies trust as one of 
the key foci of this investigation. Trust has become increasingly relevant in recent research in 
Common Pool Resource Theory. According to Ostrom (2009), collective-action theory has 
focused more on payoffs in social dilemmas, rather than trust. Empirical studies have 
indicated that trust has a central role in overcoming social dilemmas and that a favorable 
outcome in a social dilemma relies mostly on the likelihood that appropriators will 
reciprocate in a trustworthy manner. 
 As Schlager stated, “increasing dissatisfaction has emerged with the state-centered 
policy programs pursued. In many instances in which national governments and centralized 
bureaucratic agencies intervened, claimed ownership….or imposed regime, results have been 
disappointing…government-owned or managed forests are degraded.” Ostrom addresses 
possible solutions with the characteristics listed above as well as the need for a change in the 
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governmental relations with the public and approaches to community-based management. 
Schlager (2004), like Fiorino (2006), believes that the governmental “rules need flexibility 
and varied approaches to inclusivity”. There needs to be easier access to information and 
lower enforcement costs, therefore making management more capable. Schlager also states 
that there should be more investment in the governing capabilities of the appropriator versus 
command-and-control, which is strongly supported by the Bradshaw work mentioned earlier. 
Schlager (2004) concludes that, “It is to the topic of reconnecting citizens and stakeholders 
with environmental governance that this volume turns next”. 
Along with Ostrom’s approaches to common pool resource management, an 
innovative idea emerged with the Oscar Arias (1986-1990) administration in Costa Rica. The 
commencement of a more integrative, sustainable approach involved the notion of ecological 
citizenship. This concept has been an emerging idea internationally. As Rodrigo Gamez, the 
Director and President of the National Biodiversity Institute of Costa Rica (INBio) stated,  
 
“We need to change people’s attitudes to nature toward a greater level of 
complexity. To change attitudes, we need to know what we have, because one 
doesn’t value what once doesn’t know, and the tragedy of tropical forests has 
been that they have had no value more than the wood in them and the land they 
grow on…[L]et’s prove that we should conserve the biodiversity of the country 
because we know it and use it.” (quoted in David Rains Wallace, 1992, p.151) 
 
 
 A way to facilitate this task is including community participation in the national parks 
system and in the revenue generated from the national parks. The mixed management 
approach that allows local economies to prevail is one option. Training and employing local 
tour guides and maintaining locally run businesses is another, but admittedly difficult when 
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many of the communities are marginalized since foreign resorts and tourism businesses hold 
much of the revenue-share generated through this business sector.  
 Regarding Common Pool Resource Theory, specific institutional arrangements that 
act to guide collective action in successful common pool resource management regimes have 
been recommended.  Elinor Ostrom (1990) defines eight institutional arrangements and 
techniques for a sustainable common pool resource management plan: (1) clearly defined 
boundaries; (2) congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions; 
(3) collective-choice arrangements that allow for the participation of most appropriators in 
the decision making process (4) effective monitoring by those who are involved, or held 
accountable to the appropriators; (5) graduated sanctions for appropriators who fail to respect 
community rules (6) conflict-resolution mechanisms which are direct, inexpensive and easy 
to access; (7) minimal recognition of rights to organize (e.g., by the government) (8) 
organization in the form of adaptive governance at multiple levels (nesting).   
 While there has been a plethora of studies revealing the utility of these eight 
principles in common resource management, La Amistad is a unique case due to its 
expansive territory and bi-national nature. The diversity of the terrain and the limited 
resources on either side of the border contributes to differing management approaches and 
results. La Amistad is so extensive that the park management is divided bi-nationally and 
regionally with a designated Caribbean and Pacific side of the park on each side of the 
border. Costa Rica tends to focus its efforts on the highland and Pacific ecosystems, while 
fewer resources are evident on the Caribbean side. Panama focuses its management on the 
medium elevation and highland areas (Carbonell, 2005). 
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Focusing on collective-choice arrangements that allow for the participation of most 
appropriators in the decision-making process and organization in the form of adaptive 
governance at multiple levels (nesting) will be especially relevant to understanding global 
and regional problems (Dietz et al, 2003). My project explores the extent to which the 
governance of La Amistad International Park involves diverse, collaborative efforts within 
the local communities in Costa Rica and Panama and the financial support and scientific 
investments of international NGOs. 
 
The Geography of the Commons   
Much of the commons research focuses on smaller scale resources, but due to the 
extensive size of La Amistad, scale is a relevant consideration for any management solution. 
From a geographic perspective, according to Giordano (2003) many resource problems 
emerge when there is a given sociopolitical scale and the resource users with exclusive rights 
do not coincide with the resource domain, thus creating problems with efficiency and equity 
of the resource. With all spatial scales (local, national and global) having vested interests in 
La Amistad for a variety of reasons, including economic, environmental and political, there is 
mismatch between resource users and the resource domain. 
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Figure II: Spatial Perspective on Common Pool Resources (Giordano, 2003) 
 
 
 While La Amistad International Park has fixed boundaries, there are four 
administrative regions managing the park and migratory, terrestrial and aquatic species 
crossing boundaries throughout. From a geographic perspective, La Amistad has migratory 
spatial implications. There are agricultural frontier issues in Panama in which park 
boundaries have been neglected, so there is spatial conflict between the resource and rights 
domain. Giordano’s (2003) states, “one of the conditions for the existence of commons 
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problems is the lack of well-defined property rights.” Clear spatial boundaries with clearly 
defined property rights are of great importance from a geographic perspective of resource 
management. The fluidity of the boundaries of La Amistad, arising from local to 
international pressures, supports the assertion by Paasi (1986) that, “a region is 
comprehended as a concrete dynamic manifestation of social (natural, cultural, economic, 
political, etc.) processes that affect and are affected by changes in spatial structures over 
time.” 
 Other large-scale and transboundary spatial considerations for common pool resource 
management have been considered in the 2003 Science article entitled “The Struggle to 
Govern the Commons” by Dietz, Ostrom and Stern. Three principles are deemed relevant for 
the large-scale resources: analytical deliberation, nesting, and institutional variety. Analytical 
deliberation involves dialogue between the resource users and scientists and can help build 
trust or social capital. Nesting or institutional arrangements means that there are many layers 
of governance, rather than simply centralized management. Institutional variety is when there 
are a variety of institutional rules and forms, such as community self-governance, markets, 
and hierarchies within the system (Dietz, Ostrom & Stern, 2003).  
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“Glocalization”  
With the movement of people, goods and ideas continually expanding across national 
borders, communities across the globe are becoming more connected. This idea is known as 
globalization. Some of the benefits of globalization include the rapid rate of information 
dissemination worldwide, international financial support by NGOs and intergovernmental 
organizations in the developing world for various causes, collaborative efforts between 
various governments and organizations to reach similar goals, and the spread and 
advancement of innovative technology. However, globalization does come with its 
drawbacks, such as the possible loss of unique culture due to the melding of cultures 
internationally, international pressures (whether through politics or financing for certain 
agenda setting), and “highly uneven geographical and social outcomes” (Dickens, 2003). 
While the movement toward globalization increases, humans act as free agents 
maintaining the power to oppose, accept or adapt to these global forces on a local, more 
personal level. This form of response to globalization on a community level is a concept 
known as “glocalization.” In many circumstances, by connecting to global resources and 
knowledge and strategically balancing local conditions and needs, glocalization has brought 
positive results.  As Thomas Friedman (2004) observed, some global forces enhance and 
modernize local communities without overpowering them.  
Some of these international influences are the direct result of combating international 
commons problems. An example is the installation of international hydroelectric projects on 
rivers running through La Amistad with the goal of receiving funds through carbon credits 
under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism project. Other international 
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influences involve the UNESCO Biosphere Reserve and World Heritage designation, with 
the goal of biologically and culturally conservation. The results in the buffer zone regions 
vary greatly as the hydroelectric projects are on the Panamanian side, but with implications 
for the international park. International influences are constructing, deconstructing and 
reconstructing local regions or even eco-regions in the case of La Amistad as “The 
institutionalization of regions may take place on all spatial scales, not only between the local 
level and the state” (Paasi, 1991). My research project integrates concepts from regional 
geography and biogeography to spatialize common pool research in La Amistad. 
Additionally, my research also addresses how two competing narratives emerged attempting 
to reshape the management as well as the geography of conservation. 
 
Forest Conservation Narratives  
 
Introduction to Forest Conservation  
 Throughout the past half-century, national governments worldwide have increasingly 
converted land to protected areas, with forest reserves, game reserves, national monuments, 
and national parks constituting 5% of the earth’s terrestrial surface and receiving some form 
of protection (Pfeffer, Schelhas & Day 2001). The SLOSS debate was at the beginning of the 
construction process and until the 1980s traditional forms of centralized, top-down 
management of protected areas, paralleling the single large conservation area, prevailed as 
the model in numerous developing countries. During the 1970s Costa Rica was referenced as 
a “model on how to preserve natural areas” by the U.N Food and Agricultural Organization 
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in its adoption of the traditional top-down approach (Evans, 1999). By the early 1980s the 
effectiveness of top-down management in these protected areas was beginning to be 
questioned by conservationists and policymakers due to alleged ineffectiveness and 
corruption. An alternative proposal, community-based conservation, (Barret, Brandon, & 
Gibson 2001) emerged with Ostrom becoming a prominent figure in this field.  A challenge 
inherent in the transition to an integrated management system is the inclusion of traditional 
top-down vertical management systems and personnel with horizontal systems and new 
partners (Kettle, 2002). This alternative type of integration is a goal that La Amistad 
International Park is pursuing at different rates and with different approaches across its 
regional and international borders.   
“Fences-and-Fines” Approach  
“The crown jewels” (Dilsaver, 1994) of America, also documented by Ken Burns 
(2009) as “America’s Best Idea”, are the National Parks in the United States. The National 
Park System is based on the “fences-and-fines” approach of top-down management through 
coercion and enforcement. The system is set up to manage behavior through a set of 
homogeneous standards that cover an assortment of conditions (Fiorino, 2006). This 
traditional approach of park management by national government authority has been a model 
for forest conservation internationally (Schelhas & Pfeffer, 2009). Costa Rica utilized this 
approach and by 1976 the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization published A Manual for 
National Parks Planned, for which characterized Costa Rica as an archetype for planning and 
implementation of protected areas (Evans, 1999). 
  34 
The conservation model of “fences-and-fines” was a political move by the Costa 
Rican government and was the start of government environmental protection programs. 
Regardless of local or traditional conservation practices, in the case of La Amistad, the 
creation of the park created new boundaries and laws to be enforced by a central government.  
In fact, during interviews at the BriBri (Costa Rica) and Naso (Panama) indigenous 
territories, multiple participants mentioned their dedication to the protection of the forests 
over centuries. “Traditionally, culturally we have been working well protecting the mountain 
for thousands of years, our ancestors. And they [MINAE] say they need to come and regulate 
or that we don’t know something. I am not in agreement with this” (CRC, 72). 
In the early conservation years in Costa Rica, land was expropriated and boundaries 
created for the “preservation” and “protection” of the park. Prior to the economic boom with 
eco-tourism and the adoption of the integrative approach that incorporated local economies 
and mixed management, many squatters and farmers whose livelihood was based on cattle 
grazing and farming were relocated for the protection of the park. Daniel Fiorino’s views on 
the United States “old” environmental regulation are relevant since Costa Rica modeled its 
park system after the U.S. system. Some of the applicable assumptions of the “old” 
environmental regulation Fiorino (2006) discusses, “deterrence is the best strategy [because] 
only rules backed by sanctions affect behavior…goals are best achieved through a top-down 
strategy of bureaucratic control …conformity with a set of rules is the desired outcome” 
(Fiorino, 2006).  
Some of the governance problems that arise in a traditional system include 
adaptation, capacity, and scale. According to Ostrom (1998), “national governments are too 
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small to govern the global commons and too big to handle smaller scale problems.” 
Adaptation of a traditional system involves flexibility and the ability to accommodate new 
horizontal systems and manage the dynamic nature of globalization. Capacity refers to 
having the resources to manage efficiently and effectively. Scale involves the mismatch 
between centralized government control and local requirements and the need for 
decentralization to address more localized issues (Kettl, 2002). Additionally Dietz, Ostrom 
and Stern (2003) state that, “if sufficient resources are made available for monitoring and 
enforcement, such approaches are effective…but when governments lack the will or 
resources to protect ‘protected areas’ command and control approaches are less effective. 
One of the biggest issues in the conservation of La Amistad from the perspective of park 
functionaries and NGO workers was the lack of financial resources. 
By the 1980s these problems were addressed by policymakers, conservationists and 
scholars and support of bottom-up conservation approaches emerged. Designating park 
territory was the first step but, according to Abel, et al (2010), “Wildlife conservation in 
Cascadia begins inside of our protected areas, governments, and non-governmental 
organizations but will be finished, for the good or the bad, outside of them in the places and 
spaces between the region’s parks and sanctuaries.” 
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Characteristics of the Wildlife Conservation Narratives 
Traditional Narrative Emerging Narrative 
Exclusion Inclusion 
Protected areas Land use patterns 
Prohibited Sustainable development 
Managed by state Managed by the community 
Modern Postmodern 
Top down Bottom up 
 
Table III: Traditional vs. Emerging Conservation Techniques (Campbell, 2000) 
 
Community-Based Natural Resource Management  
The controversies and criticisms of top-down resource management led to an 
alternative bottom-up strategy known as Community-Based Natural Resource Management 
(CBNRM), as illustrated by the “Counter-Narrative” elements in the table above (Campbell 
2000). Historically, central authorities in natural resource management excercised micro-
management of local communities, but the community-based concept aimed to empower and 
cede decision-making to local communities (Barrett et al., 2001). CBNRM is an alternative 
that ideally would help communities achieve both conservation and development goals 
concurrently (Berkes, 2007). Studies have documented numerous successes that contrast the 
command-and-control centralized management of natural resources worldwide in achieving 
sustainability with the successful union of communities and protected ecosystems. There 
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have also been failures under certain circumstances of CBNRM approaches (Ostrom, 1990). 
With successes and failures in community-based resource research, Ostrom and colleagues 
have determined the institutional norms common to successful management of common pool 
resources. 
The belief that the communities might more efficiently and effectively manage local 
natural resources is derived from some assumptions about these communities. Foremost, 
planning that occurs in the same geographic location as the natural resource immediately 
subjects the planners to the ramifications of their management practices. This creates a 
system in which the local managers are involved directly with the outcomes of the system 
and, therefore, have incentives to sustainably use and manage the resource (Agrawal & 
Gibson, 1999; MaCay & Jentoff, 1996).  Second, the proximity of the managers to the 
natural resource promotes a rapid diagnosis of problems and responses to site-specific needs 
(MaCay & Jentoff, 1996). Finally, local knowledge of a specific place is passed from 
generation to generation and this provides local communities with enhanced ecological 
experience, knowledge, and vested interests in the local natural resources (Agrawal & 
Gibson, 1999; Bradshaw, 2003). 
Some of the failures that can occur in CBNRM are due to assumptions about the 
communities themselves. One common assumption is that a community is a homogeneous 
group with shared goals in a natural resource management scenario (Barret et al., 2001). 
Communities are dynamic, changing over time and encompassing diversity among socio-
economic, gender and generational divisions (Berkes, 2004). Due to this variability in social 
and economic factors, the creation of community-based institutions in conservation 
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management can be challenging (Ostrom, 1990). Another concern is a greater focus on the 
community itself and the community’s participation, rather than focusing on the conservation 
goals (Berkes, 2004). Bradshaw (2003) demonstrates that there is a tendency to assume that 
local management will engender better decision- making and sustain long-term goals and 
incentives. Along the same lines, there also is the notion that sustainability is inherently 
imbedded in community-based management, as well as there existing an adequate knowledge 
base of the resource to be managed and an integrated system of social, economic and 
environmental systems. These are problems of credibility and capacity. 
The first case study presented by Bradshaw involves a pilot project of ten 
community-based forestry management projects in British Columbia that were given a five-
year probationary period to prove effective forestry management. After five years, the 
projects were reviewed and only four of the ten community-based projects were able to start 
harvesting. Six of the projects failed due to lack of initial funds, unaffordable regulatory 
costs, and land issues with native land claims. These issues fall under the category of 
capability. The second case study involves the siting of a privately-run hazardous waste 
treatment site near the community of Swan Hills, Alberta. Due to the desire for jobs and the 
provision of tax incentives within a community somewhat disconnected to the local area 
because of the presence of temporary migrants, the community accepted the siting near its 
town. Within 30 kilometers of the waste site, wildlife was contaminated after several major 
accidents. This community-based management failed due to a lack of credibility. The town 
was not interested in long-term goals but, rather, a quick economic payoff. When initiating 
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community-based projects and decentralizing power, it is important to assess credibility and 
capability. 
Bradshaw examines the issue of credibility by looking at the connection between 
successful community-based resource management and the community maintaining a sincere 
interest in the security of the resource overtime. Regarding capacity, the community has to 
have the ability and means to achieve this goal (Bradshaw, 2003).  
It is difficult to understand local-level processes or community-level resource 
management without looking at the larger social, political, and economic forces that 
influence these processes and their outcomes. This is especially difficult when transitioning 
from a centralized managed system to community-based management in which the central 
authority “bestows” decision-making power on communities. Agrawal and Gibson (1999) 
stress the importance of analyzing linkages between local-level processes and external 
groups, whether state, NGOs or other entities, when dealing with community-based resource 
management, as well as the need for local-level institutions to have diversity among 
institutional representatives.  
One program that presents itself as a transition from top-down governmental 
management to community-based initiatives around La Amistad International Park is the 
Parks-in-Perils (PiP) program led by the Nature Conservancy. This initiative started in 1995 
with the idea that strengthening local community organizations and expanding their capacity 
would encourage more conservation in the areas surrounding the park. By identifying serious 
stressors, PiP states that they work with a variety of stakeholders. These attempts at greater 
stakeholder participation still remain very exclusive in La Amistad, as this research 
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demonstrates. PiP also helps in the coordination of the bi-national commission with the four 
regional governmental agencies that manage La Amistad, part of their consolidation program 
(“Parks in Peril”, 2007).  
 In researching La Amistad International Park, I focused on collective-choice 
arrangements that permit the participation of most stakeholders in the decision-making 
process and on organization in the form of adaptive governance at multiple levels (nesting). 
These elements are pertinent for understanding the different global and regional problems 
that exist and how they vary across the four regions of the park. 
 
Co-Management and Integrated Conservation and Development   
Co-management has had its successes and failures throughout Costa Rican 
conservation history. Co-management usually entails shared responsibility and management 
between the community and the government. Adaptive co-management is a term that 
incorporates more of the complexities that emerge when combining horizontal and vertical 
linkages, with NGOs as partners, on local, regional, national and international levels (Berkes, 
2004).  Currently there is one co-management project running successfully at Cahuita 
National Park, located in the La Amistad Biosphere. One section of Cahuita National Park is 
managed by eight community park functionaries paid by park entrance donations and the 
other section is run by nine MINAE park functionaries. The rangers collaborate in the 
management of the park daily and have a joint council that meets in the park for decision-
making (CRCa, 76).   
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 Stemming from the “participatory” approach of community resource management 
within which local community stakeholders maintain some form of involvement in protected 
area management (in contrast to the “fences-and-fines” approach), there emerged the idea of 
an integrated conservation and development approach (Kubo & Supriyanto, 2010). This 
approach is one form of “co-management” that has emerged due to (1) low levels of 
governmental spending on natural resource management, (2) growing awareness of 
deforestation worldwide and (3) increasing local pressure for greater participation in resource 
governance (Agrawal, Chhatre & Hardin, 2008). 
The UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment incorporates integrated conservation and 
development projects (ICDPs) in their objectives of sustainable forest management. Former 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan founded the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 2001 as a 
way to assess both environmental degradation and the impact this has on human well-being. 
The results incorporate research from over 1,300 experts internationally and help to establish 
methods for the sustainable use of ecosystems, while achieving both conservation and human 
well-being. 
As addressed in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, ecosystem services are 
essential to human well-being and poverty reduction. The structure of many traditional 
national parks restricts the access of local communities to natural resources, thus confining 
the livelihood of these communities and limiting sources of economic development. To 
provide for local community needs from generation to generation, it is necessary to practice 
sustainable natural resource management, which is achievable through integrated 
conservation and development. This approach links economic development projects in these 
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buffer zone regions to natural resource conservation and creates a desirable closed-loop cycle 
that makes livelihood and conservation self-sustaining. With conservation obligations, 
communities receive more support from resource administrators and community workers can 
more easily develop a trusting relationship (Kubo & Supriyanto, 2010), a key factor in 
successful resource management among stakeholders. 
There has been a recent critique of the integrated development approach from the 
editors of Parks in Peril (Brandon, Redford and Sanderson, 1998). These editors state “the 
trend to promote sustainable use of resources as a means to protect these resources, while 
politically expedient and intellectually appealing, is not well grounded in biological and 
ecological knowledge.” However, Wilshusen et al. (2002) states that, as an approach, there is 
room for improvements rather than throwing out the whole concept, as the integrated 
approach is one that does include a comprehensive picture of natural resource protection. 
Other approaches tend to fall short of incorporating the intricate dynamic of social, 
economic, political and ecological attributes. 
ICDPs have developed with the help of international and local NGOs in buffer zone 
communities of national parks worldwide, including projects in the buffer zone communities 
of La Amistad International Park in Costa Rica and Panama. Some of the more successful 
projects are continuing to expand bi-regionally and bi-nationally through networks of local 
associations in the communities on the Pacific side of La Amistad.  
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Buffer Zones  
“Buffer zones are defined as zones peripheral to a national park or equivalent reserve, 
where restrictions are placed on resource use or special development measures are 
undertaken to enhance the conservation value of the area” (Sayer, 1991). Conservation 
International collaborated with McDonald’s Corporation, Clemson University and, 
subsequently, Texas A & M University to create a buffer zone project utilizing this definition 
in Costa Rica on the Pacific side of La Amistad, known as the Amistad Conservation and 
Development program or AMISCONDE (McGray, 2003). 
The creation of buffer zones was originally conceived as a conservation tactic. Buffer 
zones act to delineate the “core” conservation zone of the protected area from the outside 
land by providing a space contiguous to this “core” that helps to protect it. By organizing 
activities of lower impact, such as organic, shade-grown coffee or sustainable ecotourism, the 
buffer region helps to deter activities that could lead to degradation in the “core” 
conservation region (UNESCO, 2000). Activity in the core zone is limited to activities of 
monitoring and research as shown in Figure III below. Recreation and tourism is confined to 
the buffer and transition zones. 
Biosphere reserves, formed by UNESCO’s Man and the Biosphere Program in 1974, 
utilize the buffer zone structure in the reserves, such as in La Amistad International Park. The 
physical structure of the biosphere reserves includes three zones: (1) at least one core zone 
that is legally protected with clear boundaries, (2) buffer zones and (3) transition zones also 
known as “areas of co-operation”. These biosphere reserves were created to serve three 
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purposes: conservation of ecosystems and biodiversity, socio-economic development for 
human well-being, and educational and research opportunities dealing with global to local 
issues related to integrated conservation and development (UNESCO, 2010). My research on 
La Amistad focuses on a Biosphere reserve because this is a step in the direction of 
participatory conservation versus the traditional type of fortress conservation. 
 
Figure III: UNESCO Biosphere Zonation (Adapted from McGary, 2003)  
    
Through the selection of La Amistad International Park, a UNESCO Biosphere and 
World Heritage Site, I am able to use an interdisciplinary approach by combining ideas from 
human geography, biogeography, and political science to spatialize Common Pool Resource 
Theory. These theories guided the methods of data collection that I pursued in this research.   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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 This is an exploratory case study using a qualitative and quantitative, mixed methods 
approach. This study entails content analysis, semi-structured interviews, and survey data. 
 The research is exploratory due to the extensive geographic area that has not been 
sufficiently covered in previous case studies of La Amistad International Park. “Exploratory 
research seeks to investigate an area that has been under-researched. The data gathered is 
preliminary data that helps shape the direction of future research” (Hesse-Biber, 2011). 
Consequently, while most research conducted on La Amistad has focused on the Pacific side 
of Costa Rica, this project includes interviews, survey data and field observations from a 
representative subset of rural communities in four regions neighboring La Amistad, both the 
Pacific and Caribbean sides of Panama and Costa Rica. 
 
Case Study Approach  
The chosen research design method is a case study. There are inherent problems of 
representation, or reliability, with case studies, as a case study is a limited representation of a 
greater trend. As David E. Gray (2009) states on qualitative methods, “the research is so 
based in or confined to one context that it lacks generalizability.” Although a case study may 
lack generalizability, the results from individual case studies, such as La Amistad 
International Park, may help augment working hypotheses and contribute to furthering 
research on a topic in subsequent case studies.  According to Gray (2009), data triangulation 
and multiple triangulations are methods that improve the reliability of qualitative approaches. 
In this research data triangulation, specifically person triangulation, through data collection at 
  46 
multiple levels (community stakeholders, local members of buffer zone community 
associations, NGO workers, park rangers and administrators) is employed. Multiple 
triangulation, in which the researcher utilizes a variety of data-gathering techniques, is part of 
the mixed methods approach. A Common Pool Resource theoretical background is the 
theoretical backdrop combined with interviews, a quantitative analysis of survey data, field 
observations of an NGO community rally, observations of a meeting with La Asociación de 
Mujeres de Biolley (ASOMOBI, Association of Women of Biolley), and a meeting with La 
Asociación de Pro Biosfera-Progreso (ASOPROBIOSFERA, Pro-Biosphere Association of 
Progreso). 
However, following Poteet, Janssen and Ostrom (2010), I define a case study as 
having multiple levels of analysis with separate units of analysis. The principle units of 
analysis for a commons is defined as the participants involved in collective action or the 
“central objects” of the collective action. The specific types of cases can be defined as cases 
of a natural resource system, a policy unit, or a social group (Poteet, Janssen and Ostrom, 
2010). My research explores multiple layers of analysis, therefore touching on all three kinds 
of cases.  
In a case study approach, there are six different lines of evidence leading to six 
different data collection procedures: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct 
observation, participant observation, and physical artifacts (Yin, 1984). Five of the six case 
study methods were utilized for this research project. Documentation used an analysis of 
administrative documents, news articles, and the minutes of meetings. Archival records 
provided access to organizational records from NGOs and to maps and charts of the park and 
  47 
the greater La Amistad Biosphere. Interviews were conducted with community stakeholders, 
park officials and NGO workers. Direct observation consisted of visits to16 communities 
adjacent to La Amistad. Participant observation included two community association 
meetings and one rally hosted by a local NGO and a community in the buffer zone in 
opposition to the installation of a hydroelectric facility within the La Amistad Biosphere. 
  Regarding the validity of this case study, I strived for internal validity with critical 
self-reflection through repetition of the researcher’s understanding (Gerring, 2007). 
Understanding the importance of self-reflection and how the researcher can influence the 
outcome of the study is an important component of validity. Gray suggests repetition of 
interpretive analysis and transcription (Gray, 2009). In this study, a total of 77 interviews 
were conducted in person and were recorded. All of the recordings were listened to multiple 
times (minimum of two), translated, transcribed, and reviewed multiple times (minimum of 
three).   
 In part, this case study is an investigation based on qualitative research, one of two 
principal paradigms that currently dominate research in social sciences (Hesse-Biber 2011). 
According to Denzen and Lincoln (2000),  
 
“Qualitative research involves the studies use and collection of a variety of 
empirical materials-case study; personal experience; introspection; life 
story; interview; artifacts; cultural texts and productions; observational, 
historical, interactional, and visual texts-that describe routine and 
problematic moments and meanings in individual lives.”  
 
 Lisa Campbell (2007) utilizes a similar research design to the one I have adopted. 
Campbell focused on sea turtle conservation on the local, national and international levels in 
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Costa Rica.  This research design involved empirical research with wildlife narratives on 
these three levels, in addition to an exploration of conservation through discourse and 
material practices.  
Data Collection   
Project research includes primary and secondary data collection. The qualitative data 
were gathered in this case study through semi-structured interviews with a set of chosen 
topics. The semi-structured interview process is an iterative and flexible method. This allows 
respondents to elaborate on a set of questions that I have developed, when they wish to 
provide more detail.  Comparable studies have demonstrated the appropriateness of mixed 
method approaches in addressing institutional questions about common pool resources. 
Based on numerous case studies that examined a variety of common pool resources and the 
institutions that govern them, the methods have included in-depth interviews and 
questionnaires. Examples are the work of Elinor Ostrom at Indiana University and Edella 
Schlager and Tanya Helikka at the University of Arizona and Columbia University, 
respectively. 
 Additional studies have been conducted in Costa Rica analyzing the governing 
structure of the park system. One study in 2008, which focused on varying degrees of local 
participation in the governing process, was Xavier Basurto’s research on locally based 
biodiversity conservation and the ability of local stakeholders to maintain autonomy amid the 
strong influence of international NGOs and other influences.  Basurto (2008) also analyzed 
the modest role the Costa Rican government played in the management of these parks. 
Similar to Basurto’s research, in-person, in-depth interviews guided by institutional questions 
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from Common Pool Resource Theory were conducted with key people associated with La 
Amistad International Park.  
Pilot Survey & Participant Selection   
           
 The initial survey involved three informal discussions in August of 2010 with La 
Amistad buffer zone community members from the community of Altamira, Costa Rica, 
located on the Pacific side of the park.  Additionally, one in-depth interview with a park 
administrator from the Costa Rican side of La Amistad was conducted in August 2010. These 
initial surveys were administered to test the appropriateness and relevance of the issues I had 
identified, as well as a way to make initial contacts and establish working relationships. 
These preliminary contacts referred me to the dominant stakeholders in preparation for my 
return in January and February 2011.  These initial contacts helped to tease out the themes 
addressed in the questionnaires that I administered following the majority of the interviews.  
 With the connections made during my first visit to La Amistad, I was able to return 
for 39 days of fieldwork in 2011. MINAE park administrators aided in providing names, 
phones numbers, and emails of park administrators in other regions, community associations 
in the buffer zone region, and NGO workers in the communities adjacent to La Amistad 
International Park.  Preliminary emails to schedule community stays were sent from October 
to December followed by phone calls when necessary. I created a flexible itinerary starting in 
the regions with the most contacts, the Pacific side of Costa Rica, and was able to create 
more contacts while in the field. 
 
  50 
Semi-Structured Interviews                 
 Seventy-seven interviews throughout the buffer zone of La Amistad International 
Park were conducted over a six-week period. I visited fourteen different communities with 
five communities visited on the Pacific side of Costa Rica (Progresso, Potrero Grande, Tres 
Colinas, Biolley, Altamira), three on the Pacific side of Panama (Cerro Punta, Guadalupe, 
Las Nubes), three on the Caribbean side of Panama (Bonyick and Solon from the Naso 
indigenous reserve and El Silencio) and three on the Caribbean side of Costa Rica (Suretka, 
Alto Soki, Alto Kachabri, all within the BriBri indigenous reserve). I visited the regional 
administrative offices of ANAM, La Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente, (The National 
Authority of the Environment) in David on the Pacific and Changuinola on the Caribbean 
sides of Panama.  
 There are a total of 36 interviews on the Pacific side of Costa Rica, 17 interviews on 
the Pacific side of Panama, 13 interviews on the Caribbean side of Panama, and 11 
interviews on the Caribbean side of Costa Rica. When possible, all of the community 
member interviews were randomly selected. The community size, average number of 
household members, and target number of interviews were determined. The total number of 
estimated households was divided by the goal for the number of interviews and this number 
was used to determine how many houses to bypass to have a randomized sample across the 
population of the entire community. In the indigenous territories, the houses were randomly 
selected, but those members of the Naso community that were hired to construct the road for 
the dam were excluded from the sample due to their inaccessibility over the duration of the 
interviews. The majority of the interviews I personally conducted in Spanish following a 
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semi-structured format. There are a total of two interviews in which the participants opted to 
speak in English and seven interviews were conducted with a Spanish-Bribri translator.  
 The interview questions stemmed from two themes adopted from Common Pool 
Resource Theory: (1) collective-choice arrangements and (2) multiple layers of governance. 
Interview techniques were designed after Schelhas and Pfeffer (2008) in their La Amistad 
(Pacific side, Costa Rica) study on forest and park values and forest-related behaviors, 
among other themes, and Weber, Lovrich and Gaffney’s (2005) research assessing 
collaborative capacity around the theme of endangered species from the perspective of 
vertical, horizontal and partnership linkages. 
 The template for the semi-structured interviews aimed to elicit responses around the 
themes of conservation values and park significance, relationships and networking among 
park officials, NGOs and residents, conflict and opportunity between buffer zone residents 
and the park, and levels of participation in park events or community conservation initiatives.  
Questions were posed on the frequency of public visits to the park, interactions and 
relationships with park officials, and participation in park events such as meetings, seminars, 
talks, and/or participation in local associations involved in conservation efforts, with the goal 
of analyzing the level of involvement of the participants in conservation and park-related 
activities. I inquired about the advantages and disadvantages, opportunities, benefits, and 
limitations arising from the creation of the park. This inquiry provided insight into local 
stakeholders views of the park. Finally, I asked questions about levels of agreement with park 
regulations and if there had been any conflicts with these regulations. These questions were 
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also geared to stimulate more in-depth conversation and introduce the topic of conservation 
in La Amistad International Park.  
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Figure IV: Route of Field Research in the Buffer Zone of La Amistad  
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Survey Data  
 Following the majority (76 of 77) of the interviews, I presented eight broader survey 
questions, which touched on various themes of conservation and community involvement. 
The survey questions took five to ten minutes depending on levels of literacy and familiarity 
with La Amistad International Park. The majority of participants were able to complete the 
survey without assistance. However, a translator was hired for 12 of the surveys and 
interviews in the first of the four regions visited in the buffer zone region on the Pacific side 
of La Amistad in Costa Rica. The translator helped to sort out any discrepancies and 
miscommunications in the translation of the survey questions. Once these misunderstandings 
were acknowledged with the help of the translator, I was able to explain the intention of the 
questions to future survey participants. For the participants who were unable to read the 
questions, the questions were presented orally and the sessions recorded.  
 The questionnaires touched on the same themes as the interviews, but were also 
utilized to elicit more specific, quantifiable answers. I used a ranking system involving five 
levels of significance of particular statements and themes of conservation. I used the same 
ranking system (five levels) to analyze familiarity with park regulations, levels of 
participation and frequency, and opinions on the significance, or lack of significance, of 
avenues for public participation.  
 From the survey data a quantitative analysis was performed using Microsoft Excel 
and SPSS software to determine associations among variables in the four different regions of 
La Amistad International Park. The SPSS software was used to show the distribution of 
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survey answers and to produce a log regression to check for significant differences among 
answers for Costa Rica and Panama.   
 
Survey Data Analysis  
 A logistical regression is a test that is suited for modeling social phenomena because 
with social units many times the data is qualitative or discrete (Pampel, 2000). The purpose 
of the survey was to see whether there was a difference between Costa Rican and 
Panamanian responses. The survey data set was a small sample size with 29 from Panama 
and 47 from Costa Rica with ordinal data from Likert Scale responses. Because in the “Likert 
scale…the assumption of a normal distribution cannot possibly be justified” (Gibbons, 1993), 
a non-parametric test is needed. 
 The survey data have categorical variables (Costa Rica and Panama) and ordinal data 
due to the Likert scale survey responses that ranged from 1-5. If we look at the data as 
categorical, a contingency table can be set up. The Chi squared goodness-of-fit test 
determines the statistical significance of a hypothesis in a contingency table by comparing 
projected frequencies if the two variables are not associated with the actual observed 
frequencies (Dietz and Kalof, 2009).  However, for this data set, the Chi squared test does not 
function due to the small sample size of the data when the data are not normally distributed 
(Kennedy, 1992). The ordinal nature of the responses would be lost, which is important in the 
Likert scale testing. The Fisher’s Exact test could deal with the low sample issue and the 
Cochran-Armitage Trend test could fix the loss of the ordinal nature of the responses, but 
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both would have to be utilized, which creates layers of complexity and SPSS cannot handle 
both tests.  
 Rather than adding layers of complexity, I treated the categorical data (Costa Rica 
and Panama) as numerical, assigning them a 0 and 1. I treated the survey data as continuous, 
which would enable a t-test. However, due to the non-parametric distribution, a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) Test or the Mann Whitney test would have to be used, as it makes no 
assumptions about the distribution of the data, it is non-parametric and does not have a 
distribution. The K-S test is also used for determining if there is statistically significant 
difference between actual and theoretical frequency distributions. The K-S test allows the 
testing of a pair of distributions (Lee and Wong, 2001). However, with the K-S test and 
Mann-Whitney test multiple testing is not possible and in my survey I asked a variety of 
question with themes such as “trust” and “community participation” to conduct multiple 
testing.  
 The logistical regression was the test that allowed for an association between the x 
and y variable with data that was non-parametric, had a small sample size, maintained the 
ordinal nature of the responses, and allowed for multiple testing. Due to the observational 
nature of the data, my results are associations and alone do not reveal cause and effect 
relationships. The null hypothesis in this test is that there is no difference between Costa Rica 
and Panama. The results determine how probable the data are if the countries have the same 
regression line versus the probability of the data if the countries have separate, individual 
regression lines. If the data are significant with a p-value<0.1, then the separate regression 
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lines are a better fit and the null hypothesis is rejected. The significance level is set at 0.1 as 
the cut-off due to the exploratory nature of this study. There are no generalizations about 
populations from these data and therefore the 0.1 cut-off allows for more flexibility in 
looking at associations with these observational data.  
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CHAPTER 4: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS 
OF LA AMISTAD 
 
Historical Background  
Creation of La Amistad International Park    On March 3, 1979 the presidents of Costa Rica and Panama jointly declared their 
intention to establish an international park. La Amistad National Park in Costa Rica was 
created in 1982 and received World Heritage recognition in 1983. On February 9, 1988 this 
intent to create an international park was reconfirmed with the Directive Resolution No. 021-
88, creating La Amistad International Park in Costa Rica and Panama. The Panamanian side 
received UNESCO World Heritage recognition in 1990, and then La Amistad International 
Park received Biosphere recognition in 2000. Due to the geographic size of the park, 
spanning four provincial jurisdictions, management was divided bi-nationally and bi-
regionally.  
 In Panama, 98% of the park in located in the Bocas del Toro region on the Caribbean 
side and 2% is located in the Chiriqui province on the Pacific side (Acosta, Rodriguez and 
Simmons, 2008). There are two administrators, one for each province on the Panamanian 
side of the park. In total, there are five full-time personnel in the Chiriqui Province and four 
in the Bocas del Toro province (PaP, 63). In Costa Rica, 88% of the park is in La Amistad-
Caribbean and 12% is in La Amistad-Pacific. There are twelve park officials who cover both 
provinces in Costa Rica, with one administrator who oversees the entire park (CRP, 7). On 
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the Pacific side of Panama there have been Programs of Monitoring and Effectiveness, which 
have included the public perceptions and suggestions for the management of the park. 
 The management plan for Costa Rica was initiated in 2003 and finished in 2005. 
Costa Rica has its own commission for the park, which meets four times annually. The 
Panamanian side has its own management plan completed in 2004. There is a bi-national 
commission that worked unofficially before 2005, but was officially formed in 2005 and 
meets two times yearly. The Nature Conservancy strongly guided and supported these 
efforts. There is also a Local Council in each of the 11 Conservation Areas of Costa Rica. 
There are two Councils in the management scheme of La Amistad as the park straddles two 
Conservation Areas. In discussing this with the BriBri territorial government, ADITIBRI, 
there was no evidence of a Local Council on the Caribbean side of the park. However, there 
are ongoing efforts to create a co-management plan between ADITIBRI and MINAE. 
Chart I: Management Scheme of La Amistad Park 
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Conservation History of Costa Rica  
 During the 20th century, Costa Rica experienced a rise in the conversion of forests to 
cropland plantations and pastures to meet the growing market demand. Jointly with this 
increase in land conversion to cropland came a rise in ecological consciousness both in the 
realm of science and political activism. By the mid-twentieth century the University of Costa 
Rica, with a biology department, and various environmental conservation organizations had 
been founded and aided in increasing awareness of the need for conservation measures 
(Evans, 1999). The call for conservation even reached the president with President Ulate 
(1949-1954) declaring a national week for the conservation of natural resources in 1950. A 
biologist from the University of Costa Rica, Luis Fournier, participated in the drafting of the 
Forestry Law that was passed in 1969 (Wallace, 1992). Under this law, lands such as national 
parks and monuments were to be designated and administered as legally protected areas by 
the General Forestry Directorate.  Although this initial law was highly ineffective, with 29% 
deforestation occurring in the following decade, this policy planted the seed for the 
emergence of a larger, more involved conservationist community. This budding conservation 
community included much more governmental intervention and involvement in the 
movement for forest protection and the creation of a massive national park system (Evans 
1999). 
              The Forestry Law did not do much in the first few years and was revised in 1977. 
These preliminary revisions added tax incentives and offered technological investment loans 
for reforestation in the hope of decelerating impacts of deforestation and increasing the 
economic potential for sustainable wood production. The law was revised again in 1980, 
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1986, 1990 and 1996. Following this law in the 1980s, the Costa Rican government became 
more active by its first declaration of a state of emergency to combat deforestation (Evans 
1999). 
              One of the biggest obstacles to maintaining the parks after creation was funding. To 
overcome this barrier and create the first national reserve, Cabo Blanco, a Swedish couple 
living in Costa Rica wrote to International NGOs for donations. Success came in 1965 after 
securing enough donations to buy the land with 51% from the British World League and 
other donations from organizations such as the Sierra Club, the Nature Conservancy, the 
Friends of Nature, and the Philadelphia Conservation League (Evans 1999).  
 With an estimated 60% of the world’s terrestrial species in Costa Rica, the idea to 
create an extensive, bi-national park in the Cordillera Talamanca was proposed in 1974. 
President Carazo signed numerous agreements with Panama to initiate the park planning 
process. With frequent governmental changes, three successive governments signed the 
agreement. The planning process was approved and commenced in 1979 for La Amistad 
National Park, doubling the area of the park system. Following the creation of La Amistad, 
Mario Boza, one of the creators of the Costa Rican park system stated, “We are moving out 
of the decade of declaration and into a period of consolidation and refined management of 
the parks” (Wallace, 1992).  
 During the 1980s, deforestation remained a problem and the parks became islands of 
forest, vulnerable and isolated. During this period the realization grew that protecting the 
parks could not be accomplished solely by the park officials. Promoting the parks to the local 
communities through environmental education programs was necessary because according to 
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Mario Boza, “without the support of the people…we go nowhere” (Wallace, 1992).  The idea 
to promote participation of the local society came in the form of the National System of 
Conservation Areas (SINAC). With the creation of SINAC, Costa Rica was geographically 
divided into eleven conservation areas in 1995 with the idea of “deconcentration, 
decentralization and democratization” (Evans, 1999). This remains the current system 
employed in Costa Rica. 
 
Conservation History of Panama   
 According to Panama’s National Biodiversity Policy, one of the goals is to place 
biological and genetic resources as “the core of a national strategy and its connections with 
the economic and social development process, taking into account the challenge to improve 
the competitiveness of the country by improving life quality, decrease of poverty; and 
integration of the local and indigenous people and sustainable development” (Jaliao, Young 
& Teran, 2010).  
 In Panama, the initiatives for the protection of natural heritage sites materialized in 
1918 when the Municipal Forest "The Colmón Macaracas" was established in the province of 
Los Santos, to protect water sources and promote rational use of firewood. This protected 
area exists today. By the 1960s the government began to create forest reserves. With 
international support, especially from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 
a park system was proposed in 1972 and the first five official parks were established between 
1976 and 1984. Parks continued to be established through the eighties and nineties, growing 
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from terrestrial parks to include coastal and marine parks. The National System of Protected 
Areas (SINAP) was created in 1992 to fortify the protected areas.  SINAP was managed by 
the National Institute of Renewable Natural Resources, today known as the National 
Environmental Authority (ANAM). The legal confirmation of SINAP with ANAM as the 
governing body came with Law 41 on July 1, 1998 (“Normas Ambientales”, 2010).  
 At the start of the 21st century, community participation began to rise as communities 
helped in the declaration of parks such as Natural Monument Cerro El Gaital. Currently 34% 
of the country is managed as a protected area under the System of Protected Areas, with 
some 89 protected areas (Munoz, 2010). 
 
Present Obstacles Facing La Amistad  
 According to a park official, a major problem currently facing La Amistad in Costa 
Rica is the lack of personnel. Another impediment is the division of the park between two 
areas of conservation, i.e., the Pacific region cannot do work on the Caribbean buffer zone, 
“because there are other functionaries. We are protecting one forest, one national park, but 
we can only do work in the Pacific buffer zone…and this is a problem in the management” 
(CRP, 7). Another park official from the Pacific region in Costa Rica mentioned forest fires, 
hunting, cutting trees, extraction of minerals from the rivers, illegal tourism from Panama, 
and the indigenous reserves as the main problems facing La Amistad.  
 On the Pacific side of the park in Panama, the largest threats are similar, with forest 
fires and hunting as primary threats, but there is also the threat of infrastructure development 
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according to an ANAM park official. “The development of infrastructure, roads, and 
hydroelectric; and the population is really close to the park,” (PaP, 52). 
 On the Caribbean side of the park in Panama, the biggest concern is that the 
government is focusing on economics above buffer zone community well-being and the 
environment. “Our government thinks first about the economy and then the social and 
environmental part,” (PaC, 53). This is evidenced by the development of hydroelectric 
projects in the Biosphere Reserve that have divided the Naso indigenous reserve on Bonyick. 
There were four comments from the Naso communities in the Caribbean of Panama and five 
comments that indigenous knowledge is ignored in the current management plan. 
 On the Caribbean side of the park in Costa Rica, in the Bribri indigenous reserve, five 
community members mentioned a feeling of government neglect regarding conservation 
efforts within La Amistad. There is no nearby office, personnel, or resources dedicated to 
conservation in this area, but the Bribri have park rangers who administer the rules and 
regulations set forth by MINAE. Many participants also mentioned the rejection of 
indigenous knowledge and lack of direct participation in natural resource conservation, but 
were hopeful that this situation could be remedied in the future with the co-management plan 
that is in development.  
 
 
 
  65 
“There is the government, SINAC, MINAET with the indigenous territory, 
BriBri and Cabecar, in the west and we are really in charge of the park. 
MINAET only comes with some incidence in respect to the management of 
the park. There aren’t personnel of MINAET in this sector of Caribbean. 
Here the International Park is the ADITIBRI’s and Cabecar’s” (CRC, 68). 
“At the beginning they didn’t consult, but after some assumptions they have 
a proposal of how they will manage the park, now to remedy the 
management plan. It’s a process that started in 2004 to this moment” (CRC, 
68).  
“There is a management plan for the government, but it lacks the point of 
view of how we are managing in the moment” (CRC, 68). 
  
Hydroelectric Issue in Panama  
 All the park rangers and officials interviewed in the four regions of the park 
consistently mentioned that the threats to La Amistad have been reduced over the years. 
However, the issues in Panama with the construction of hydroelectric power in proximity to 
the park, and its effects on the buffer zone communities, is an ongoing struggle that has 
received much international attention. The story made headlines with stories by International 
Rivers, Parks in Peril, and the Center for Biological Diversity. While there has been 
international recognition of the local indigenous and community movements, in interviews 
with park officials, the hydroelectric issues were not responded to in any detail. On the other 
hand, most communities interviewed in the buffer zone of the park in Panama took a strong 
stance on the hydroelectric issue. The significance of the hydroelectric issue sheds light on 
the topics of trust, collective-choice arrangements, and nested enterprises, which are analyzed 
in the following chapter in the context of the role and influence of international pressures on 
the communities in the buffer zone of La Amistad. 
  66 
 There is a series of hydroelectric projects being proposed and already underway in 
both the Chiriqui and Bocas del Toro Provinces of Panama, with one official estimating, 
“There are more than 26 that might pass” (PaP, 36). Many projects are in progress due to the 
Panamanian government’s involvement in the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism project, in which developing countries receive funds through the sale of carbon 
credits. There has been international support and pressure from the European Union, the 
World Bank, and the Central American Commission for Environment and Development, but 
according to Sommer (2008), there has been no credible consultation with affected 
communities. 
 One project, the Changuinola 1 (Chan 75) is being constructed within the La Amistad 
Biosphere in the Palo Seco Protected Forest and the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor. The 
headwaters of the Changuinola River are of major biological significance in La Amistad 
International Park. According to the Alliance for Conservation and Development (ACD), 
“AES [Corporation] and the National Environmental Authority (ANAM) have failed to 
conduct an appropriate environmental impact assessment,” (Osvaldo and Galvin, 2006). 
According to ACD, there was a failure by the park through AES and ANAM to appropriately 
consult with the nearby Ngobe communities and complaints by Ngobe have been 
disregarded. The first approval criterion for the World Commission of Dams (WCD) is 
acquiring public acceptance (Osvaldo and Galvin, 2006). The WCD was established in 1998 
and funded by the World Bank and the World Conservation Union to address controversies 
over large-scale dams by creating internationally acceptable criteria and standards (The 
World Commission on Dams, 2000).  
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 In opposition to this dam, many indigenous groups attended the Inter-American 
Human Rights Commission meeting in October 2008 in Washington DC. The Inter-
American Human Rights Commission is an autonomous part of the Organization of 
American States that deals with the “promotion and protection of human rights” (Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights). At this hearing both Ngobe and Naso indigenous 
participants reported “discrimination, abuse and displacement” by Empresas Publicas de 
Medellin, a Colombian Company installing a dam on the Bonyick River and by AES 
Corporation, a Virginia-based company installing a hydroelectric plant on the Changuinola 
River (Sommer, 2008). While there is strong opposition to the Chan 75 project, three 
additional dam proposals are also threatening the La Amistad Biosphere. 
 To directly confront the hydroelectric projects, there is currently a petition to the 
World Heritage Committee requesting the inclusion of Talamanca Range-La Amistad 
Reserves/La Amistad National Park on the list of world heritage sites in danger. In the 
petition, the main concerns addressed are the dams’ impacts on the species populations, 
deterioration of forest with human settlement and construction, encroachment on park 
boundaries, increase in the armed conflict between Panamanian officials and indigenous 
communities near the park (Naso in Bonyick), and inadequate management and failure of law 
enforcement in the buffer zone (Petition to the World Heritage Committee, 2007). 
 With much opposition to the hydroelectric dams and the petition to include La 
Amistad on the list of World Heritage Sites in danger, La Amistad was not given the 
designation of a site in danger and the conflict has continued. When interviewing the Naso 
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indigenous reserve population, the community members who were not working on road 
construction for the dam, were adamant in their opposition to the project on the Bonyick 
River in Bocas del Toro according to the Petition to the World Heritage Committee,  
“Armed conflict has already occurred between the government of Panama 
and the Naso indigenous group because the management plan allows for 
developing the hydroelectric potential for the Park at the expense of 
indigenous lands contiguous to the Park through flooding and road 
construction. The Naso had originally agreed to discuss the dam in 
exchange for the recognition of their lands as an autonomous region, know 
as Comarca. However the Comarca still has not been granted. This fact, 
couples with the failure of the Panamanian government and the owner of 
the hydroelectric project to adequately inform the Naso community about 
the impacts of the dam has ignited armed conflict. In addition, when 
negotiating with the Naso, the government violated the traditional political 
structure and decision-making process of the indigenous group.” 
 
FUNDICCEP has led community rallies in buffer zone communities, including one I 
witnessed in Guadalupe.  This is a battle still being fought.  
 The hydroelectric projects being constructed in the buffer zone are a very contentious 
issue, with pressure added with the development of infrastructure for the dam and for the 
expected population increase in the buffer zone areas. There are several social and 
environmental implications, including distrust among stakeholders, lack of consultation or 
collective-choice arrangements with La Amistad stakeholders, and a different form of nested 
enterprises with influential foreign companies backed by the EU, World Bank, and The 
Central American Commission for Environment and Development. 
 The hydroelectric projects demonstrate how increasingly regions, such as La 
Amistad, cannot be isolated from globalization, as there are global and neoliberal forces 
constructing, deconstructing and altering regions daily. Singleton (2002) discusses the 
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impacts of external factors on watershed management in the Pacific Northwest. The larger 
the scale, linkages, and asymmetry of the resource costs and benefits, the less successful is 
the watershed planning. Singleton (2002) finds one significant predicament in the 
collaborative natural resource management processes, “is that while the process is local, 
many of the sources of the problems it seeks to address and the constituencies it must 
respond to are not.”  
 
Group Characteristics  
 Numerous factors contribute to success or failure in the management of a common 
pool resource. Ostrom et al. (2002) designate five key contributors in the assessment of a 
commons: Institutional Arrangements, Resource System Characteristics, Group and 
Individual Characteristics, External Environment, and Interaction among Factors. Through 
quantitative survey data and qualitative interviews, my results confront the intersection of 
Group and Individual Characteristics and Institutional Arrangements. A key factor related to 
Group and Individual Characteristics is trust, while the Institutional Arrangements address 
collective-choice arrangements and nested layers of governance. 
 Owing to the semi-structured nature of the interviews, the process was iterative, 
evolving from more general questions regarding the interactions between the community and 
park officials, levels of participation of the community with park events, and the relationship 
between the community and park officials, into more specific, targeted questions about 
particular obstacles to progress within each unique community or region in the park. For 
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example, on arriving at the first buffer zone community in Panama, I encountered a 
community meeting opposing the building of a hydroelectric dam in a river that runs directly 
through La Amistad International Park. This became a very important topic with the 
interview participants in this community.  
 After reviewing other studies that concentrate on environmental discourse and the 
perceptions of community members bordering La Amistad (Schelhas and Pfeffer, 2008), as 
well as eliciting opinions of community members concerning who benefits from maintaining 
a neighboring park, a common theme emerged in all four regions of La Amistad International 
Park. The levels of trust among stakeholders varied greatly and played an important role trust 
plays in the development of collective-choice arrangements and nested layers of governance. 
The next section will address the levels of trust or lack of trust.  
 
Trust across the Buffer Zone Communities of La Amistad  
 Over the course of numerous interviews, trust emerged as a key topic when 
discussing the relationship among communities, community organizations, and the park. The 
community organizations or associations act as bridges connecting the buffer zone 
communities to the park management and are, therefore, one of the mechanisms for fostering 
a trusting relationship between the park officials and the neighboring communities. This 
became apparent during interviews with community stakeholders who revealed strong 
relationships with community associations and how these facilitated more frequent 
interaction with the park. 
  71 
 Trust is an important factor among resource users. Numerous studies including those 
by Fukuyama (1995) and Putnam (1993) revealed that trust affects the functionality of 
society’s institutions. Trust can assist in avoiding situations of ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ and 
create more cooperative environments. As levels of trust decrease, willingness to cooperate 
diminishes accordingly. According to Ostrom et al. (2002), trust, among other attributes such 
as communication and the ability to create enforceable agreements, can at times enable 
individuals to move beyond self-interest and lead to the formation of, and adherence to, 
regulations, ensuring the future of the resource. Moreover, Ostrom (2009) has determined 
that trust does not solely emerge with the adoption of norms, but a particular situation needs 
to generate ample information of other stakeholder’s behavior and their probability of acting 
in a trustworthy and cost-sharing manner. With higher levels of trust in the reciprocation and 
cost-sharing commitments of other participants, the levels of cooperation increase, 
augmenting the net benefits and positively reinforcing the system. 
 The results from the surveys indicate that 74 out of 75 survey participants from all 
four regions of La Amistad find that “confidence and transparency among stakeholders” is 
important. Moreover, 65 of those 74 participants indicated that this is very important. While 
confidence and transparency are important to the participants, when asked if they believe that 
“citizens trust the government” on conservation efforts in La Amistad, there was a wide 
range of perceptions and levels of trust among stakeholders. Another survey question was 
used to identify the sense of trust or distrust among community stakeholders themselves in 
terms of conservation efforts in La Amistad: “people are generally trustworthy and honest”. 
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The responses also resulted in an interesting spread as demonstrated in Chart II below, 
showing raw survey numbers, not percentages.  
Chart II: “Trust” among Stakeholders in the Buffer Zone of La Amistad 
 These raw survey numbers, with 75 of 76 participants responding, are an anomaly 
due to the greater spread of answers compared with the other survey responses. The complete 
survey results demonstrate the vast majority of participants for the other survey questions 
leaned toward “strongly agree” and “agree” with few instances of a spread or dissonance 
throughout the survey. Due to the uniqueness of these responses, a comparison of the results 
from Costa Rica and Panama is provided below in Chart III and Chart IV with 46 Costa 
Rican responses and 29 Panamanian responses.  
 For both Costa Rica and Panama the greatest spread among responses is for the 
question about “citizens trust the government”, with only about 50% of  the responses on 
either side of the border agreeing at some level with this statement. For the statement “people 
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are generally trustworthy and honest” approximately 75% of respondents agree at some level 
with this statement (50% of respondents from both Costa Rica and Panama indicate “strongly 
agree” and about 25% “agree”). This is a leap above the levels of confidence in the 
government, but there is still noticeable variation among answers.  
 
 
 
 
 
Chart III: “Citizens trust the government” on Conservation of PILA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart IV: “People are generally trustworthy and honest” on Conservation of PILA 
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 From field observations and semi-structured interviews my analysis aimed to better 
understand the status of trust among community stakeholders and their levels of confidence 
in the operation of the park. This was accomplished by initiating this portion of the interview 
with inquiries into the relationships community stakeholders have cultivated with the park 
officials. Do you know any park officials personally? Is there a good or bad relationship? Do 
you view them as friends or more as policeman? How has the relationship changed over the 
year? How frequent are your interactions? From these interview questions it became apparent 
that local associations or community organizations mediated the majority of interactions 
within the community. The two questions used for the survey related to conservation efforts 
in PILA and were chosen due to their unique spread. Those participants with higher 
participation or interaction with associations tended to have more frequent participation in 
the park operations. 
 On the other hand, those who did not participate with the community association were 
also those community members who had minimal relations, interactions, or participation with 
park officials. Twenty-five community members interviewed indicated they participated in 
any park meetings or talks. Twenty-three of those twenty-five community members 
participated with local associations or community organizations that worked with the park to 
help organize these events and encourage public participation. There were only two 
respondents that indicated they had participated with the park in an activity and did not 
indicate participation with a local association. These findings were observed across both the 
Pacific and Caribbean portions of La Amistad in both Costa Rica and Panama and are closely 
linked to the close relationship between many of the associations and the park. The result is 
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these local associations are leading the way in connecting the park to the neighboring 
communities. While the quantitative results show that the levels of trust among community 
stakeholders and park officials vary greatly at this time, the community associations are 
encouraging communication and interactions and making concrete contributions by 
organizing gatherings and events.  
 
Trust Discrepancies with Indigenous Territories  
 The greatest difference concerning the levels of trust between the park management 
and the stakeholders in the various regions of La Amistad is the discrepancy between the 
Pacific and Caribbean sides of the park in both Costa Rica and Panama. On the Pacific side, 
from the interviews, there was minimal indication of distrust between the government and the 
stakeholders. The Caribbean side of the park in both countries is home to indigenous groups 
whose reserves are located adjacent to the park and in some circumstances are located within 
the boundaries of the park. The two indigenous communities visited during field research 
were a Naso indigenous reserve in Panama and a Bribri indigenous reserve in Costa Rica. 
 
Naso Indigenous Reserve of Panama  
 When asked “have you been affected by decisions in the park, by laws or regulations 
or any changes,” one respondent from the community of Bonyick on the Caribbean side of 
Panamanian La Amistad answered, “Yes, by the decision-making. They don’t consult us,” 
(PaC, 54). This same participant responded that he did have a conflict with the park in which, 
“They [ANAM] say that no one can take wood, but the companies come and destroy it. They 
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can come without permission and destroy the environment,” (PaC, 54). Another member of 
this same community stated in reference to the relations between the community and the 
park,  
 “It’s not very good. They give all the rights to the company and not to us. 
We have been detained by the authorities, badly treated by the police at the 
direction of the company. For this, I don’t want to listen to this company. I 
want them to leave from here, but the government has them here,” (PaC, 
55) 
 
 This same participant from Bonyick, in response to the question “If you want to 
change something, a decision such as this, like the dam here, who can you talk to?”, 
answered “Well, with very few people, not with all, because the majority don’t know us well 
and we don’t know them and they don’t want to know anything about us and we don’t want 
to know anything about them,” (PaC, 55). 
 Much of the tension that still exists in the Naso territory relates to the hydroelectric 
project that is being constructed in the Bonyick River by a foreign company. This company 
has paved a road connecting Bonyick to the town of El Silencio and has hired many local 
construction workers. “Before, Naso went from El Silencio in boat and walked. Now there is 
a difference, it’s the development by the government. For me it’s not development. When 
they say it’s development, for me it’s limitations that they are trying to control the territory” 
(PaP, 57).    
 Those Naso that I interviewed were not employees of the construction company and I 
was unable to interview those that are employed by the company. Therefore, the sentiment 
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expressed in the interviews is not a full picture of the perspectives of the Naso community 
and those interviewees admitted that the hydroelectric project has divided the community. 
 
Bribri Indigenous Reserve of Costa Rica  
 On the Caribbean side of the park in Costa Rica, there are not issues with the 
construction of hydroelectric dams, but there is still tension that exists between MINAE and 
the Bribri indigenous territory. In the community of Suretka, where the Bribri government, 
ADITIBRI is located, one participant discussed the conflict that still exists: 
“In the park that we have, conflict exists because of MINAE, which is the 
institution of the state. It’s supposed to care for the park, but they don’t care 
for it and so for La Amistad International Park it’s the indigenous that care 
for the park, but without salary. They don’t pay us. We do it as volunteers 
because we are on the border of the limit. And the conflict we have with 
MINAE is also that they give permits for extraction for minerals, permits 
that they give for minerals within the park and within the indigenous 
community. For us the park isn’t the park seen by the state, it’s the park that 
for so many years the indigenous have conserved,” (CRC, 67). 
 
 Another resident of the Bribri indigenous territory demonstrated some opposition to 
the system of management of the park when asked “Are there any regulations of the park that 
you are not in agreement with?” This participant responded with “Yes…traditionally, 
culturally we have been working well, protecting the mountain for thousands of years, our 
ancestors. And they say they need to come and regulate or that we don’t know something. I 
am not in agreement with this,” (CRC, 72). 
 Those interviews conducted with the Bribri residents reveal conflict between the 
Bribri territory and the regulations imposed by MINAE. The interviews were conducted with 
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a Spanish-Bribri translator and this translator was also an ADITIBRI (Bribri government) 
park ranger. Many residents had very concise answers rather than providing a more detailed 
description, as seen in much of the testimony by the Naso, due to the presence of the 
ADITIBRI park ranger. However, the interviews in both indigenous territories, the Naso 
from Panama and the Bribri from Costa Rica, show a much tenser relationship with the park. 
There is more of a disconnect than the relationships that have been formed by buffer zone 
communities with the help of local associations on the Pacific side of the park.  
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CHAPTER 5: INTERVIEW AND SURVEY RESULTS  
 
Institutional Arrangements 
 
 Institutional arrangements for La Amistad International Park are extremely complex 
due to the extensive area that the park covers, the park’s bi-regional and bi-national nature, 
and the difference in institutional norms that have developed in the diverse communities in 
the buffer zone communities, including indigenous reserves. Even years after the creation of 
the park, co-management agreements are still being created to take into account the 
heterogeneity of the buffer zone and help communities find alternative, sustainable economic 
means to replace previous activities, such as cutting trees, hunting and grazing cattle. 
Institutional arrangements are dynamic and constantly changing due to factors such as 
shifting governments, reduction or augmentation of financial resources, the state of 
biodiversity in the park, and outside influences altering arrangements, such as the installation 
of numerous hydroelectric dams by foreign companies in the Panamanian regions of the park. 
Collective-choice arrangements and polycentric or nested layers of governance are two of the 
eight institutional arrangements for sustainable common pool resource management that will 
be discussed and compared bi-regionally and bi-nationally in the context of institutional 
arrangements. 
 
Collective -Choice Arrangements 
 
A collective-choice arrangement signifies the capacity for participation of most 
appropriators in the decision-making process or “most individuals affected by the operational 
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rules can participate in modifying the operational rules,” (Ostrom, 1990). This is a critical 
component in the institutional arrangements of La Amistad, as a consequence of its 
designation as a UNESCO World Heritage Site and the recognition of La Amistad 
International Park as a Biosphere Reserve. This concept allows for rules to be adapted to 
local conditions rather than being subject to overarching, one-size-fits-all policies. Also, 
according to UNESCO, some of the main characteristics of Biosphere Reserves include, 
“focusing on a multi-stakeholder approach with particular emphasis on the involvement of 
local communities in management,” and “integrating cultural and biological diversity, 
especially the role of traditional knowledge in ecosystem management.” Examining how 
buffer zone communities across the four different regions have been able to take part in 
decision-making in formal ways, or become involved in other informal activities, will 
demonstrate how and where the management scheme of La Amistad is fostering collective-
choice arrangements.  
 
Formal Pacific Community Participation in Costa Rica and Panama 
 
 
 On the Pacific side of La Amistad International Park, both Panama and Costa Rica 
have unique ways to encourage community participation in the decision-making process. 
Both countries have implemented a bi-annual assembly in which particular stakeholders are 
invited to express concerns and considerations about the management of the park.   
 In Costa Rica there is a bi-annual meeting in which the park administration, MINAE, 
meets with the Consejo Local (Local Council). The Consejo Local is selected at an assembly 
in which the community members vote on representatives to attend the meeting with the park 
  81 
administration. This vote is conducted every two years and the Consejo Local meets every 
three months.  The Consejo Local was derived from the Law of Biodiversity in which there is 
a requirement for civil society participation with the Consejo Local in all 11 conservation 
areas of Costa Rica.  According to one park official, “the last wasn’t very successful because 
the people didn’t participate much, but now we are going to do another assembly that calls to 
all the local groups, private businesses, all members of the municipality to select again the 
members of the Consejo Local…and what happened in the last assembly, the members that 
were selected were not very responsible like others and legally there was nothing to do 
except to complete the duration and therefore it wasn’t very successful” (CRP, 7). 
 Panama has a similar system set up with the Program of Monitoring and 
Effectiveness conducted by civilian participants bi-annually. The Program of Monitoring and 
Effectiveness was created with the help of the Nature Conservancy and uses Likert scale 
ratings and open-ended answers for evidence and observations of various aspects of the state 
of the park and park management. According to one local guide who participates, “every two 
years they do a test of how they manage the park, ANAM. They do a test to see how the 
management of the park is going and I think it’s very important,” (PaP, 42). As this 
participant was discussing his experience, he also mentioned, “Not everyone [is invited]. You 
can go if you are involved in these things,” (PaP, 42).   
 While both countries have legally implemented some form of civil participation, 
randomly surveyed community members did not participate in either the assembly to 
nominate the Consejo Local in Costa Rica or as a volunteer on the Consejo Local. I could 
find only one randomly surveyed community member in the Pacific Panamanian community 
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of Guadalupe who had participated twice, receiving an invitation due to his participation in 
the National System of Civil Protection and his work as a guide in La Amistad. However, 
those community members that were also members of local associations, such the Red 
Cuercus in the buffer zone of Costa Rica or ADATA in the buffer zone of Panama stated that 
the organizations did participate in the assembly for the Consejo Local in Costa Rica and the 
Program of Monitoring and Effectiveness in Panama. The community organization is 
assuming an active role in civil discourse and trying to insure that the community’s voice is 
heard in park decision-making. 
 
Survey Results for Informal Community Participation in Costa Rica and Panama, Pacific    
 During the interviews with Pacific buffer zone community residents of La Amistad, 
those community residents that were not working with the local associations stated that they 
did not participate in the assembly for the Consejo Local or in the Session of Monitoring and 
Effectiveness. These same participants were administered a survey immediately following 
the interview in which they were asked to “Please indicate which organizations you 
collaborate with and how often.” In the survey, MINAE and ANAM were listed with the 
options of “very often”, “often”, “sometimes”, “not very often” and “not at all”. The results 
for collaboration with MINAE and ANAM are shown in Chart V below.  
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Chart V: Frequency of Collaboration of Buffer Zone Community Members with the MINAE 
and ANAM in the Pacific of La Amistad 
 
 
 These results show a definite spread of responses with polarized answers in the 
Pacific region of Costa Rica. There are many community residents who collaborate “very 
often” with the park, while there is also a significant number of residents who do “not at all” 
collaborate with the park. On the Pacific side of Panama a significant number of participants 
indicated they did participate “very often”, with the remainder of the respondents spread 
across the other categories.  
 One of the discrepancies between the survey responses and the interview responses is 
due to the phrasing of the questions. In the survey, in Chart V above, shown are the levels of 
collaboration with the park. On the other hand, the interview asks specifically about 
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participation as a civilian in such opportunities as the assemblies, the Consejo Local, and the 
Session of Monitoring and Effectiveness. Collaboration can include many informal events 
such as attending talks, meetings, the park anniversary celebration, and many other social 
opportunities distinct from actual involvement in the formalized decision-making. While 
there are greater levels of participation in informal collaborative activities, there are lower 
levels of formal participation by civilians in actual management in the Pacific region of La 
Amistad. 
 
Informal and Formal Community Participation in Costa Rica and Panama, Caribbean  
Interview Results for Community Participation, Caribbean 
 
 The Caribbean buffer zone communities of La Amistad consist of indigenous reserves 
in both Costa Rica and Panama. According to MINAE officials and Bribri community 
members, the management of the park in Costa Rica on the Caribbean side is evolving its 
participatory mechanisms by developing a co-management plan that includes cultural 
heritage and indigenous knowledge. The ANAM park rangers, officials, and administrators 
on the Caribbean side of La Amistad in Panama uniformly refused to answer any questions 
about the management of the Caribbean side of the park.  Therefore, the emergence of co-
management on the Caribbean side of La Amistad could not be analyzed. 
 Nonetheless, many residents of the Naso Reserve in Panama expressed concern about 
the lack of collective-choice or the current lack of a means of participation. One resident 
answered a question regarding their participation with ANAM, “Very little do I participate 
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with ANAM because they are other. We always call attention to ANAM, but they never pay 
attention to us, therefore I participate very little in reunions with them,” (PaC, 55). According 
to one organizational leader who helps with sustainable development projects for indigenous 
communities in buffer zones of national parks on the Pacific side of La Amistad in Panama, 
 
 “The traditional knowledge of the indigenous communities, in my opinion, 
not only of Kuna, but of Naso, Ngobe, is very valid. But when they do 
management to improve the management of natural resources this 
knowledge is left outside. The knowledge that is used is from outside and 
the indigenous don’t understand this. When thinking in management of 
natural resources, they think of their traditional ways. In my opinion the 
indigenous groups know how to manage the natural resource much better 
than others and more if you compare it to the management of ANAM. If 
ANAM doesn’t enter, the indigenous know how to manage the resource 
well. But when institutions enter…[sigh]…therefore we think in 
strengthening this,” (PaC, 53). 
 
 
  
 Also one Naso discussed attending the 2008 InterAmerican Commission on Human 
rights in Washington DC to combat the hydroelectric projects around the Naso Reserve. 
“We are revising the marked limits of the park, but with 2008 with it 
[hydroelectric] starting, PILA, and the government are favoring the 
company. It has come and there are new limits much higher than before and 
whatever technical person validates it…they don’t consult the 
village…Amistad says we have the right and the government has the right, 
and we know this,” (PaC, 56). 
 
 
 When the La Amistad International Park was first created by Costa Rica with a 
centralized management system installed, these traditional forms of knowledge were ignored 
in favor of internationally established scientific practices. This is a tendency noted by Berkes 
(2002) when discussing the effects of higher level institutions on local institutions; local, 
traditional or indigenous knowledge; and the resulting loss of the traditional practices of 
knowledge. Rather than just focusing on biodiversity in the park, the co-management plan 
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being drawn up includes bio-cultural considerations. These will help to incorporate the 
voices of the indigenous communities and create a situation more consistent with collective-
choice arrangements. According to a Bribri resident of Suretka,  
 
“The operative part here, caring for the park, it’s bad. They don’t have an 
office, they don’t have people trained here… due to our culture we know 
that it’s a treasure here. The Bribri know the importance of the minerals, the 
medicinal plants, the river, the water, all of the resources that exist here. It’s 
potential for the Bribri and we care for this,” (CRC, 67).   
 
 
 
 Many Bribri are waiting and ready for the co-management plan between MINAE and 
ADITIBRI to be implemented.  
 
“At the beginning they didn’t consult us, but after some assumptions they 
have a proposal of how they will manage the park…It’s a process that 
started in 2004 to this moment…it’s difficult because the last 2 or 3 years 
we are planning co-management between MINAE and the indigenous 
territories but with the idea of cultural management because it is within the 
territory of Bribri and you have to see the relation of the Bribri in the case 
of caring for these areas. So we are planning a management plan between 
the state and the indigenous territory. Now we are in the process of doing 
this and it’s a management plan in which we have direct participation and 
also that can give us more resources so we can have an office and have 
more for the park,” (CRC, 68).  
 
  
 Currently there is a process recognized by MINAE and Bribri to include the BriBri in 
the management more. According to the Bribri, they already care for the park and follow the 
guidelines set by ANAM, but as volunteers and without the legality of “co-management”.  In 
Panama, there is much current activity and complexities in the relationship between ANAM, 
the Naso territory, and the foreign hydroelectric projects. Indicative of this situation is the 
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refusal of the ANAM officials to answer any questions regarding the management or the 
hydroelectric projects on the Caribbean side of the park.  
 
Survey Results for Community Participation, Caribbean 
 
 There are some inconsistencies between the interview results and the survey results. 
Chart VI show some of these discrepancies with the interviews. While the majority of those 
interviewed said they did not collaborate with MINAE and ANAM, in the results for Panama 
there is a spread. In Costa Rica, once again it is very polarized. The majority of participants 
state that they participate “not at all”, while all but one of the remainder answered with “very 
often”. The low number of survey participants also affects these results, with only 13 
participants on the Caribbean side of Costa Rica and 12 on the Caribbean of Panama. 
However, it is interesting that on both the Caribbean and Pacific sides, Panama had a large 
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spread across the answers while in Costa Rica the results remained very polarized. 
 
Chart VI: Frequency of Collaboration of Buffer Zone Community Members with  
MINAE and ANAM in the Caribbean of La Amistad 
 
 
Interview Results for Stakeholder Inclusion and Exclusion 
 
 A research project conducted by West and Clark (2006) demonstrated the gaps in the 
Nature Conservancy’s methods that are used to identify and target relevant stakeholder 
participation in management of La Amistad International Park. The principal participants 
identified in the study were grouped into NGO, Governmental, Scientific and Business 
categories - focusing on the larger organizations. According to Varvasovszky and Brugha 
(2000), “Stakeholders can be defined as actors who have an interest in the issues under 
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consideration, who are affected by the issue or who - because of their position - have or could 
have an active or passive influence on the decision-making and implementation processes.” 
 Following this definition, I randomly selected thirty-three interview participants from 
five buffer zone communities (Progreso, Potrero Grande, Tres Colinas, Biolley and Altamira) 
on the Pacific side of La Amistad and asked them if the park had affected them, either 
positively or negatively. I also inquired about means of participation with the park, whether 
formal or informal. 
 
 Affected by Park Not Affected by Park 
Participates with Park 9 5 
Does Not Participate with Park 7 12 
Table IV: Pacific, Costa Rica Community Perception and Participation in La Amistad 
  
 The results in Table IV show that 16 (48.5%) of participants do feel that the park has 
affected them either negatively or positively, while 17 (51.5%) participants feel the park has 
not affected them. Of those affected, 9 (56.3%) do participate with the park in some manner. 
This means that 7 (43.7%) of randomly surveyed buffer zone community members do not 
participate with the park, but are affected by the park and are considered stakeholders. 
Moreover, of the 16 participants affected by the park, 10 indicated this was in a positive 
manner, 4 stated it was in a negative manner and 2 said in the early years it was negative, but 
that now they view the park as beneficial.  
 A significant percentage of stakeholders do not participate in meetings, talks, or any 
activity with the park, which shows some gap in the stakeholder collaborative efforts. There 
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is a variety of reasons stakeholders don’t participate, with one respondent stating “No, I don’t 
participate in meetings with the park, but there are meetings of the park. They always have 
reunions and very few are open to the public. They have their people that work together in 
the reunions” (CRP, 10). Other community members mentioned participation and inclusion 
with the park: “we participate as a community and have a relation with the administration of 
the park. Before we were affected but now we benefit, not just us but others in Costa Rica. 
But the relation with them is good, we are included now” (CRP, 14). 
 Most of the people who participate in park activities do so through collaboration with 
local organizations such as ASOMOBI, Red Cuercus, ASOPROLA, or other community 
organizations that were not listed in the initial principal stakeholder list by the Nature 
Conservancy. One resident of Biolley stated, “Right now I don’t participate with MINAE, 
but the community in general participates in the decision-making in the protection of the 
park, as a community. We have some processes with the park,” (CRP, 17).  
 
 Affected by Park Not Affected by Park 
Participates with Park 5 2 
Does Not Participate with Park 4 4 
Table V: Pacific, Panama Community Perception and Participation in La Amistad 
 
 Fifteen community members were interviewed in three buffer zones communities 
(Cerro Punta, Las Nubes and Guadalupe) on the Pacific side of the park in Panama. The 
results in Table IV show that 9 (60%) of participants do feel that the park has affected them 
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in some way. Seven residents (40%) stated that they have not been affected. Of those 9 
participants who can be considered stakeholders, 5 (55.6%) participate in some way with the 
park, while 4 (44.4%) of the stakeholders do not engage in any form of participation. Of the 9 
participants that were affected in some way, all 9 stated they were affected in a positive way, 
the park “brings tourism, many visitors come from other provinces and other countries to 
visit the park” (PaP, 41) and “yes the tourism yes, it has been beneficial...the tourism of 
PILA has been beneficial” (PaP, 48). When asking resident if they participated in any 
reunions or activities with ANAM or FUNDICCEP, they answered “No, because they have a 
group, but I am not part of that group” (PaP, 38). 
 The indigenous territory results differ greatly from the results on the Pacific side of 
the park. There were 5 of 11(45.5%) Bribri that stated the park had affected them and 6 of 
13(54.6%) Naso participants that indicated the park had affected them. All of these 
stakeholders stated that the park negatively affected them. Futhermore, the Bribri park ranger 
who conducted the translation for the interviews and surveys discussed with me how the 
Bribri participants were presenting more positive answers than their reality. This was due to 
his presence and the park ranger discussed the many barriers to traditional lifestyles for the 
Bribri, such as the limits of cutting trees and hunting and therefore the struggles that exist in 
feeding their people.  
  92 
 
 
 
 
Collective-Choice Survey and Interview Distinctions Across La Amistad  
 
 On the Pacific side of the park, there is a transparent system of institutionalized, 
formal community participation with the Consejo Local and the Session of Monitoring and 
Effectiveness. The success of these mechanisms was not measured, though it was difficult to 
find many who participated in these events during random surveys.  
 On the Caribbean side of the park in Costa Rica, there is a formal co-management 
plan still being created, while the implementation of a formal governmentally-mediated 
means of participation on the Caribbean side of Panama is uncertain based on this research. 
There is one park administrator in Costa Rica for both the Pacific and Caribbean, while in 
Panama there are two separate administrators for the two separate regions. On the Pacific 
side in both Costa Rica and Panama, the administrators, rangers and other officials discussed 
opening the management of the park and attempts to include more community stakeholders. 
On the Caribbean side of Panama, the hierarchical nature of management obstructed any 
attempts to gather information. Permission is necessary for any information dissemination 
and this is a difficult process. The community’s responses on both sides of the park in 
Panama covered a wide range of opinions, but were more polarized on both sides of the park 
in Costa Rica. There were many more survey and interview participants on the Pacific side 
because of easier access to the communities.  
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Chart VII: Frequency of Collaboration of Randomly Selected Buffer Zone Community 
Members with the Governmental Park Agencies of MINAE and ANAM 
 
 
 
Polycentric or Nested Layers of Governance  
 A “polycentric” system, as defined by Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961), “connotes 
many centers of decision-making which are formally independent of each other…to the 
extent that they take each other into account in competitive relationships, enter into various 
contractual and cooperative undertakings or have recourse to central mechanisms to resolve 
conflicts…” Elinor Ostrom (1990) views this arrangement as nested enterprises or 
organizations in the form of adaptive governance at multiple levels. Nested enterprises may 
consist of voluntary, public associations that are established to hold discussions and confront 
problems or private associations that may help with cost -sharing. Nested enterprises is a 
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principle that is frequently observed in larger, sustainable institutional regimes and according 
to Ostrom (2008) they involve the idea that “appropriation, provision, monitoring, 
enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of 
nest enterprises,” or take on a structure of a governing network rather than a hierarchy. 
 
Local Leadership by Local Institutions    
 Local leadership, in the context of nested enterprises and related to the promotion of 
collective-choice in park management, is apparent in the efforts of local institutions or 
associations that exist primarily in the Pacific regions of La Amistad in both Costa Rica and 
Panama. While local institutional efforts have fallen behind in the Caribbean regions of the 
park, there are also fewer state resources dedicated to these regions of the park, with only one 
park office situated in the park on the Caribbean side of Panama. Even with limited 
resources, there are currently efforts within organizations such as FUNDICCEP to work 
across the Chiriqui jurisdiction on the Pacific side of Panama and form partnerships with 
communities within the Bocas del Toro jurisdiction on the Caribbean side of Panama. 
However, as Singleton (2002) points out, “while good leadership is a necessary component 
to successful collaboration, it is obviously not enough.” 
 The local leadership and local institutional discussion will focus on ASOMOBI, 
Asociación de Mujeres de Biolley (Association of Women of Biolley) and the network they 
take part in, Red Cuercus (Cuercus Network); ASOPROLA, Asociación de Productores La 
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Amistad (La Amistad Association of Producers); and a select number of organizations on the 
Pacific side of Costa Rica that associate with FUNDICCEP in Panama.  
 
Local Institutional Outreach Efforts    
 Some of the local institutional outreach efforts and forms of informal public 
participation are conducted through environmental education programs that exist on the 
Pacific side of the park through collaborations between MINAE of Costa Rica and ANAM of 
Panama. Some of the success of these environmental education programs is seen in the 
interviews when asked, “Do you think it is important to protect the forest? Why or why not?” 
On the Pacific side of Costa Rica, 19 out of 30 community members, (63.3%), not including 
park officials or local institutional leaders, responded with answers that cited the importance 
of protecting the forest to promote clean water and clean air, and to provide a home for the 
animals. Of these 30 buffer zone community residents, 13 out of 30 (43.3%) also mentioned 
tourism as a benefit, with many participants also mentioning the importance of maintaining 
limits on the number of tourists, as excess tourism could lead to negative impacts on the park.  
 On the Pacific side of Panama, the buffer zone stakeholders, exclusive of park 
officials and local institutional leaders, were more inclined to indicate that tourism was the 
main benefit of protecting the park. Out of 13 community members, 9 (69.2%) responded 
that tourism alone was the main benefit of the park based on the economic benefits the 
community receives. “It’s [La Amistad International Park] very good because many tourists 
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come to see the nature,” (PaP, 39). Only 1 (7.7%) respondent mentioned that the creation of 
the park was good for the rivers and protecting animals. Six of 13 (46.2%) residents 
mentioned that the construction of dams could negatively affect the community and the park. 
Many of these same respondents mentioned that the dams could deter tourism and negatively 
affect the economy. 
Benefits of La 
Amistad 
Costa Rica, 
Pacific 
Panama, Pacific 
Clean air, clean 
water, or habitat 
for animals 
63.3% 7.7% 
 
Tourism 43.3% 
 
69.2% 
Table VI: Benefits of La Amistad International Park from the Community Perspective 
 Many factors play into why Costa Rican buffer zone community residents stressed 
certain environmental benefits of the park, while Panamanian buffer zone community 
residents were more inclined to discuss tourism and the economic benefits of La Amistad 
International Park. Local institutions and park officials in both countries discussed 
environmental outreach and coordinating education programs throughout the communities 
and many community residents discussed environmental education programs for school 
children. Any differential impact of the environmental education programs on the 
communities within the two countries is hard to discern. Another factor to consider is the 
numerous economic pursuits the Panamanian government and international hydroelectric 
companies are initiating in the La Amistad Biosphere, with a number of dam and 
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hydroelectric projects. One Panamanian organizational leader from the Caribbean side 
described it this way: 
 “Our government thinks first in the economy and then the social and 
environmental. This is why they think in the hydroelectrics here. We have 
laws about the protection of this and it’s not important because they only 
think in the economy and they just say something isn’t valid and go through 
with it. It’s dangerous because they only think in the economy, first the 
economy,” (PaC, 53). 
 
 Eleven of the thirteen residents of the buffer zone community on the Pacific side of 
Panama were very opposed to and concerned about these projects. These residents saw the 
economic benefits of tourism as contributing most positively to the conservation of La 
Amistad International Park. Further research needs to be conducted to understand if the 
government’s economic pursuits in the region, which could negatively affect the environment 
and communities, influence the perception of community residents about the   importance of 
protected areas.  
 The hydroelectric projects have the potential to create a greater divide between the 
community and the governmental agencies, rather than to promote more types of collective 
action and participation. On the other hand, FUNDICCEP, a local NGO from the Pacific side 
of Panama, has considerable power and influence, independent of governmental institutions, 
and it demonstrates evidence of polycentric governance. FUNDICCEP will not have the final 
word on the hydroelectric issue facing these buffer zone communities of La Amistad, but it 
has organized well-attended meetings and rallies in opposition to these projects and is 
helping the communities apply pressure to ANAM and to ANAM’s work on environment 
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impact assessment (EIA). This EIA will determine whether hydroelectric projects can be 
pursued. Nested enterprises like FUNDICCEP have a dual role, collaborating with ANAM 
on many environmental projects but at the same time, independently wielding influence on 
other issues affecting the buffer zone communities and the conservation of La Amistad Park. 
 
Local Institutions: Pacific side of Costa Rica   
 The buffer zone communities located on the Pacific side of the park in Costa Rica 
have a network of associations known as the Red Cuercus that are “fighting for common 
goals… promoting the creation of tourism in the communities next to the park and trying to 
establish agreements of cooperation with ACLAP [La Amistad Pacific Conservation Area]-
MINAE”(Villegas, 2007):  
“The purpose is to unite associations and fortify organization that the 
associations couldn’t do alone. Also we care for the park, always and trying 
to find alternatives to better the life for people and the communities. For 
example, hunting, as a network we can offer sustainable projects so people 
don’t have to continue hunting,” (CRP, 27) 
 
 There are currently five participating organizations: The Association of Ecologic 
Chamber of Tourism of Santa Maria of Brunka (La Asociación Cámara Ecológica de 
Turismo de Santa Maria de Brunka- ACETUSAMA), The Association of Tourism of Tres 
Colinas, Potrero Grande (La Asociación Cámara de Turismo de Tres Colinas de Potrero 
Grande), The Association of Organized Women of Biolley- ASOMOBI), The Development 
Association of Biolley (La Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Biolley - ADI BIOLLEY) 
and The Community Group of La Lucha, Portero Grande. The Association of Producers, La 
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Amistad (La Asociación de Productores La Amistad de Altamira- ASOPROLA), was 
previously a member of the Red Cuercus, but stated that their goals do not fully align with 
those of the Red Cuercus and they are an independent association.  
 Red Cuercus coordinates control and protection of the protected area, planning, 
training, and tourism. Some of the ongoing economic activities carried out by the Red 
Cuercus include production and processing of organic coffee, organic berry production, 
honey production, selling organic vegetables, and production of organic fertilizer. Other 
projects are reforestation, regeneration of soil, recycling, design and planning of the 
biological corridors, and environmental education “that stretches 130 kilometers across the 
boundary of PILA with 43 schools and 5 colleges,” (CRP, 27). Many of these activities are 
informal collective action in which the park collaborates with the local community. 
Organizations such as the Red Cuercus have independent organizational rules and are self-
governing, thus creating their own level of involvement in the nested enterprise and in their 
formal participation with the Consejo Local. 
 Sustainable tourism is another large component of the Red Cuercus, promoting 
adventure tourism to provide a sustainable means of income for the community, as well as 
educating tourists about the importance of the protected area. There are trails outside the park 
for visitors that have been created with help from the Nature Conservancy and small 
donations from the United Nations Development Programme.  
 The Red Cuercus supports the management of the La Amistad Pacific Conservation 
Area and MINAE, assisting with control and protection, visits to the park, participation in 
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anniversary activities at the park, environmental education, and monitoring animal species. 
Red Cuercus is connecting the community with the park through environmental education, 
sustainable development opportunities, and alternatives to cutting trees, hunting, or forms of 
agriculture that could harm the critical buffer areas. According to one local institutional 
leader “We work here in the community, but we unite and try to face projects together…we 
have a co-responsibility with the park… we work with SINAC doing an environmental 
education program for the area and we are having the community maintain trails rather than 
people from afar” (CRP, 27).  
 
Local Institutions: Pacific side of Panama   
 One of the most powerful local leaders and local institutions is FUNDICCEP, located 
in the Chiriqui Province on the Pacific side of La Amistad International Park in Panama. 
Formed in 1998 based on a project called AMISCONDE, Amistad Conservación y 
Desarrollo (Conservation and Development of Amistad), FUNDICCEP works in 
environmental education and, specifically, sustainable production with various organizations 
in the region. FUNDICCEP is part of a 12-organization alliance, ADATA, La Alianza Para el 
Desarrollo Ambiental de Tierras Altas (The Alliance for Environmental Highlands 
Development). There are only seven workers at the program level but, through alliances and 
collaboration, FUNDICCEP has become a powerful force. FUNDICCEP has worked on 
numerous projects with Conservation International and the Critical Ecosystem Partnership 
Fund. Moreover FUNDICCEP received third place from the Ford Motor Company for their 
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environmental conservation efforts for their project, “Conserve Out Pride, La Amistad 
Biosphere Reserve” (“FUNDICCEP”). FUNDICCEP has also provided much support for 
communities, such as Guadalupe in their fight against the installation of hydroelectric 
projects in the region.  
 Originating with the AMISCONDE project of Conservation International and with 
support from the McDonald’s Corporation, the focus was to create a project that connects 
biodiversity and conservation to the community. The purpose is to deter harmful human 
activities, such as infringement on the protected areas and illegal burning, and promote forms 
of sustainable development. While some findings from this project (Gorman, 2003) have 
demonstrated community improvements, there have been reports of insufficient focus on the 
biota and assessment of biodiversity. Others like Miller (2003) have found barriers in 
communication among collaborators and inadequate utilization of local institutions in joint 
efforts with the AMISCONDE project. 
 FUNDICCEP emerged from the AMISCONDE project as a powerful local leader for 
the communities in the region on numerous issues. According to one ANAM official 
FUNDICCEP is leading the way in collaboration between the Pacific and Caribbean sides of 
the park, the collaboration “now doesn’t exist, about a month ago, by means of 
FUNDICCEP, they are trying to start this because in the Pacific it is a strong organization” 
(PaC, 53). Currently, FUNDICCEP is also leading the fight and rallying the community 
against the installation of hydroelectric dams in the La Amistad Biosphere Reserve. This 
issue is of dire importance to the agricultural community in this buffer zone, with concerns 
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about water rights and inundation, and may have unforeseen ecological impacts on the park. 
FUNDICCEP participates bi-regionally and bi-nationally to help strengthen the local 
community networks in the buffer zone of La Amistad. FUNDICCEP has worked with the 
Red Cuercus on the Pacific side Costa Rican buffer communities for the past three years, 
initiating joint activities, exchanging information, and building a stronger bi-national 
relationship. With the deliberate burning of the Costa Rican park office located near the 
Costa Rican-Panamanian border in 2010, the border collaboration at Rio Sereno between 
MINAE (Costa Rica) and ANAM (Panama) has become more challenging. According to a 
local institutional worker, “we are in the process of remodeling. It has been a lot of years and 
a little bit abandoned by ANAM [park office], so we are rehabilitating the building so we can 
establish it in the center again,” (PaP, 36). The bi-national program FUNDICCEP is 
collaborating with the Red Cuercus on the goal of having the program center at the ANAM 
office in the border town of Rio Sereno. 
 FUNDICCEP has played an important role in bringing more public participation into 
park projects and influencing decision-making with its participation in the Session of 
Monitoring and Effectiveness. In 2008 the directors of PILA from ANAM and FUNDICCEP 
began to develop a strategy for environmental education together. Before this, “there were 
various separate entities…recently we are trying to have more coordination with the 
educational institution and universities” (PaP, 36).  
 Collaboration with the park has begun to mature 18 years after the creation of the 
park in 1990. A local guide from Guadalupe and a local institutional leader from Cerro 
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Punta, both from the Pacific side of La Amistad in Panama, agreed that the barriers and 
limitations to collaboration partially stem from administrative changes and the need to re-
initiate the process with each administration. In this sense, local autonomy plays a secondary 
role to political processes. As park projects, rules, and collaborations change, approval is 
required from each incoming government.  
 Countering these impediments is the Program of Monitoring and Effectiveness 
conducted by civilian participants bi-annually that involves Likert scale ratings for: 
conditions of the park, the application of the law, the management of historic sites and, or 
natural resources, knowledge of cultural traditions among the community in the buffer zone, 
and the receipt of benefits from the park.  
 Another organization that forms part of ADATA, is ASAELA, La Asociación Agro-
ecoturístico La Amistad, the Agro-ecotourism Association of La Amistad, formed in 2003. 
There are eight full-time members who collaborate in operating a restaurant at the entrance to 
the park at Las Nubes, work with the community in picking up trash, cleaning streets, 
planting trees, and doing environmental education. As a local institution like FUNDICCEP, 
ASAELA has received invitations to participate in reunions with park officials and 
participates in the Program of Monitoring and Effectiveness. Similar to FUNDICCEP, 
ASAELA has also transcended international borders and works with ASOMOBI from Costa 
Rica, but is also an independent association and has autonomous decision-making.  
  104 
 
Governmental Influences on Local Institutions and its Effects on “Nested Enterprises”   
 Two different outcomes, successful cooperation between a local community and a 
state agency or “capture” in which the agency or even a division of the agency has interests 
linked closely with the interests they oversee  (thereby affecting their ability to regulate in the 
interest of the public), may result from co-management models (Singleton, 2000). Agrawal 
(1998) discusses how governmentally-authorized co-management can lead to states assigning 
local institutions authority. Conversely, the idea of “capture” does not support the success of 
nested enterprises in which organizations make independent decisions. This is especially 
apparent when opting for co-management in a management scheme such as La Amistad in 
which the park was initially managed by the government, leading to the forced relocation of 
many community members on the Pacific side and limitations imposed on lifestyles in those 
indigenous communities located adjacent to and within the park boundaries.   
“Here in Panama, when they created the park, in no moment did they ask 
the communities, never did they do this. Therefore, when they created the 
parks of protected areas, the communities didn’t know what happened. One 
day to the other they were in the park and they couldn’t be and couldn’t do 
this or that… in order to conserve resources that exist, the people in the 
communities first need to think in their food and improve their way of life, “ 
(PaC, 53) 
 
 These are issues resource managers must face in La Amistad both on the community 
and international levels due to the transboundary nature of the resource system. There are 
differences among the four regions in the role of the state in the management of the park and 
the buffer area. 
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 On the Pacific side of the park in both Costa Rica and Panama, after years of effort 
and collaboration, much more of the “co-responsibility” mentality is emerging among local 
associations and networks like the Red Cuercus and ADATA with the governmental agencies 
of MINAE and ANAM.  The support for Red Cuercus and ADATA comes in the form of 
technical support for the associations and collaborative efforts in environmental education, 
park anniversary activities, and trail building. Financial support does not flow directly from 
the park to these community associations. As co-management is emerging with more 
community participation, cooperation in these communities is much more widespread than is 
in evidence with the “capture” model on the Pacific side of the park. There is much more of a 
nested enterprise scenario, with many local organizations taking charge with appropriations 
in the buffer zone, monitoring, and other conservation-related activities.  Both the 
governmental organizations and local associations have transboundary efforts. When 
questioned about working on the Caribbean side of the park, only FUNDICCEP from 
Panama stated that it was working on bi-regional relations.  
 The Caribbean side of the park in both Costa Rica and Panama is more complex due 
to the indigenous reserves and the great extent of parkland, with 88% of the park situated on 
the Caribbean side. The monarch of the Naso and the ADITIBRI jointly set the laws for the 
Naso and Bribri Reserves. Once the park was created, these indigenous communities had to 
follow the park rules set by ANAM and MINAE. There is only one park office on the 
Caribbean side of Panama and there is not a nearby park office on the Caribbean side of 
Costa Rica. The closest MINAE office locations are in Limón, Hitoy Cerere, Cahuita and 
Manzanillo.  
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Figure V: Map Showing the Closest MINAE and ANAM Offices to La Amistad 
 ANAM and MINAE rely on these communities and their respective local institutions 
to implement and abide by park rules and regulations. One resident from the Bribri 
community of Suretka stated, 
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“The majority of the territory next to the river is within the national park 
and this affects the communities that are in the forest because they can’t use 
the materials that they had, our cultural system…it limits these things. 
Following the [creation] of the park it’s hard to live there. But there are 
communities that have been in the park for thousands of years. Now they 
are trying to negotiate something so they can utilize the cultural norms,” 
(CRC, 66) 
 
 The Bribri government, ADITIBRI, in a previous quote, stated that they take care of 
the park, without salary. I also learned that control of the park and distribution of permits is 
through ADITIBRI. “MINAE only comes with some incidence in respect to the management 
of the park. There aren’t personnel of MINAE in this sector…here the International Park is 
the ADITIBRI and Cabecar’s.” This dichotomy in which many of the ADITIBRI participants 
and Bonyick residents feel responsible both morally and legally for the care of the park with 
limited resources, yet at the same time are limited in their cultural traditions and norms, is 
demonstrated throughout the interviews in the Bribri territory. In spite of this, there is the 
process that was initiated about three years ago to create a co-management plan between the 
indigenous territories and MINAE that will allow for more input by the indigenous people. 
 Currently, the Bribri do have a neighborhood council called the Junta de Vecinos, 
which also helps carry out the conservation laws, report violators, take action against 
violators, and distribute permits. On the local level there is voluntary action, but it would be 
an exaggeration to consider this evidence of polycentric governance. The conservation laws 
were imposed and, until the co-management plan is finished and implemented, the locals are 
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enforcing the regulations determined by a centralized system without direct or indirect 
influence. 
 Wekso is the park ranger station on the Caribbean side of Panama. It is situated across 
a river from the community of Bonyick. To arrange a visit to La Amistad it is necessary to go 
through the Naso Organization of Sustainable Development and Ecostourism (Organización 
de Desarrollo Sostenible y Ecoturismo Naso, ODESEN), a tourism agency run by Bonyick 
natives, or by contacting ANAM. The ranger I met at Wekso was of Naso heritage and Naso 
guides were also provided. Extensive collaboration and control over tourist visits occurs 
between ANAM and this community due to the proximity of the entrance to this private, 
indigenous community. I conducted interviews with park officials from every other region in 
La Amistad without a problem. Once I arrived at Wekso, I encountered a strict, top-down 
bureaucracy in which the park ranger refused to answer a single question. While many Naso 
were willing to discuss the park, the hydroelectric project, and the relationship with ANAM, 
the Naso park ranger was unwilling to say a word. Much tension was expressed over hunting, 
fishing, and cultural limitations in the park. When asked if there are regulations or rules on 
which there was agreement, a Bonyick, Panama resident responded, “The same hydroelectric 
because it’s going to destroy the forest. For so much time we have cared for the forest and 
maintained it and they are coming to destroy it. They say it’s development for the village, but 
it’s not. It’s development for them, not for us,” (PaC, 55). For the Naso territory, rather than 
a situation of cooperation and evidence of local decision-making and polycentric governance, 
the dynamic appears to be one of “capture”, as the monarch of the Naso territory is allowing 
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a foreign hydroelectric energy company to build a plant in the Bonyick River that could 
potentially have many negative social and environmental impacts. 
 
National & Global Support for Local Associations    
 Many local associations in the buffer zone communities of La Amistad are working 
with the governmental agencies of MINAE and ANAM in sustainable development projects 
and caring for the park through trail maintenance and monitoring programs, There is much 
national and global financial and technical support facilitating many of these activities. Chart 
VIII below shows some of the most frequently mentioned financial contributors from the 
interviews conducted. Chart IX shows the associations that were interviewed during field 
research and their location. 
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Chart VIII: Global & National Financial Support for Buffer Zone Associations 
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Chart IX: La Amistad Buffer Zone Associations Interviewed 
 As stated before, local assocations provide a bridge to connect the park with the 
buffer zone communities and help create common objectives and collaborative projects. 
Many of these projects are financed and come to fruition with the support of global 
contributors such as the Nature Conservancy, Conservation International, and the United 
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Nations Development Project,with technical support and grant-writing help from park 
officials. Chart VIII does not include all of the grants, donations, loans and other financial 
support. It is limited to those mentioned specifically by local association leaders who were 
interviewed, as shown in Chart IX above. There are also more sustainable development 
associations in the buffer zone, but the interviews were limited to the major associations and 
then any associations that were accessible during field research. 
 From Chart V, it is clear that there is asymmetrical financial support both on the 
naitonal and global scales. Most of the economic support for sustainable development 
projects are directed toward the Pacific side of La Amistad in Costa Rica and Panama, the 
side that appears to have more polycentric governance. Even on the Pacific side where more 
resources are available, financial resources are minimal and the major limitation in park 
management mentioned uniformly by all regions, park officials, and associations, is the lack 
of resources.  
“In conservation there is a problem with the lack of people. It’s a problem 
to do conservation, not in conservation. Right now with twelve 
functionaries from the whole Costa Rican park, including administrators 
and park guards, much work that we want to do is hard because we don’t 
have personnel…I can’t do work in the buffer zone on the Caribbean side 
because there are other functionaries. We are protecting one forest, one 
national park, but we can only do work in the Pacific buffer zone…” (CRP, 
7) 
 
 In addition to the lack of resources, there is a barrier that exists between the Pacific 
and Caribbean sides of the park regarding management. While the park official above 
mentioned not being able to conduct work in the buffer zones, which includes technical help 
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for associations and collaborative work on trail-building and environmental education, the 
officials from the Caribbean side state,  
 
“The indigenous care for the park, but without salary. They don’t pay us. 
We do it as volunteers…and the conflict we have is MINAE gives permits 
for extraction for minerals…within the park and within the indigenous 
community” (CRC, 67).  
 
“We are really in care of the park. MINAE only comes with some incidents 
in respect to the management of the park…there aren’t personnel of 
MINAE in this sector…we don’t have sufficient personnel,” (CRC, 68).  
 
 
 As seen by the flow of contributions from both global and national financial 
contributors, the Caribbean side of the park is still behind on sustainable development 
projects and supporting parties such as associations to mediate between the park and the 
community. There is a co-management plan emerging between MINAE and ADITIBRI, but 
it has been a long, tenuous process. One limitation expressed by a Bribri community member 
was “just feeding the people,” (CRC, 66). As the co-management process is time-consuming, 
polycentrism with collective-choice arrangements has not emerged, but there is movement in 
that direction. 
 On the Panamanian side, there is some financial support for local Naso sustainable 
development initiatives through organizations like ODESEN and Corredor Biológico that are 
successfully facilitating tourist visits to the park at the Wekso Station and with the 
community of Bonyick and others. However, the community leaders did not mention any 
collaboration or financial support from international organizations. The level of local 
decision-making is hard to decipher as the strict, hierarchical style of management made it 
difficult to find a park official to interview and gave the impression that polycentric 
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governance is not being realized in the near term on the Caribbean side of La Amistad in 
Panama.  
 
 
Statistical Differences between Costa Rica and Panama   
 While the interviews present some of the similarities and differences for the elements 
of trust, emergence of collective-choice arrangements, and existence of polycentric 
governance, some of the survey questions provide insight into other elements that the 
communities deem important when discussing conservation of La Amistad International 
Park. Among the survey questions, there were six that demonstrated statistical significance, 
or a significance difference between the respondents in Costa Rica and the participants in 
Panama. In some circumstances multiple questions on the same concept, such as trust, were 
run through the same binomial logistical regression. The results for all of the regressions are 
in the appendix. 
 The themes that came out with a significant difference between Costa Rica and 
Panama respondents (P<0.1) included the “Community Participation”, “Meaningful 
Involvement”, “Shared Conservation Goals”, “Tourism”, “Familiarity with Park 
Regulations”, and “Frequency of Collaboration” with both the park and local associations.  
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“Community Participation”    
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model 10.942 3 .012 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
Community involvement plays a significant  
role 
16.993 13777.581 .999 
The public should be involved in the decision- 
making process 
1.311 .730 .073 
We need more avenues for public participation  
in decision-making 
.801 .536 .135 
 
 
“Community Participation”    
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model 7.791 1 .020 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
The public should be involved in the decision- 
making process 
1.465 .737 .047 
 
 
“Meaningful Involvement”    
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model 11.062 1 .001 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
Citizens feel that they can have meaningful 
Involvement in decision-making 
1.489 .605 .014 
 
 
“Shared Conservation Goals”    
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model 5.653 1 .017 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
Shared conservation goals among stakeholders -.896 .427 .036 
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“Tourism”    
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model 3.041 1 .081 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
Tourism .539 .363 .138 
 
 
“Familiarity with Park Regulations”    
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model 3.275 1 .070 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
Are you familiar with the rules and regulations  
of PILA? 
.330 .189 .080 
 
 
“Frequency of Collaboration”    
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model 3.901 2 .142 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
How often do you collaborate with other 
Organizations and stakeholders in PILA? 
-.519 .298 .082 
Please indicate which organizations  
(MINAE, ANAM)you collaborate with and  
how often. 
.397 .228 .082 
 
 For the first difference, “Community Participation”, three questions were taken into 
account. The question asked for the participant to indicate the level of agreement with the 
following statements in terms of conservation efforts in PILA. The three statements were, 
“Community involvement plays a significant role,” “The public should be involved in the 
decision-making processes,” and “We need more avenues for public participation in 
decision-making.” The difference, as shown in the charts below, looks minimal, though 
  117 
statistically significant with a p value of 0.012. Costa Rica has a larger spread than Panama, 
though for all three questions the answer centers on “strongly agree”. While the majority of 
participants demonstrate that they believe public participation, or collective- choice 
arrangements, is important, levels of actual participation from the public have a greater 
spread in Panama and are very polarized in Costa Rica.  
 
“Community Participation”, Costa Rica 
 
“Community Participation”, Panama 
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 “Meaningful Involvement” is the second statistically significant theme. The statement 
that addressed this was, “Citizens feel that they can have meaningful involvement in 
decision-making.” The chart below shows minor discrepancies, except Costa Rica has a 
larger spread than Panama. Panamanians 100% agree with the statement. The statistical 
significance of the model is 0.001. This question looks at whether citizens feel that it is 
possible to participate in a meaningful and significant manner. On the other hand, while 
many believe they can have meaningful involvement, especially in Panama, levels of actual 
participation are variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Meaningful Involvement” 
 
 In response to the question, “how important is each of these issues in regards to 
conservation of PILA? The results of “Shared conservation goals among stakeholders” 
demonstrate that once again this is a very important theme to the majority of respondents 
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administered the survey. The statistical significance is 0.017 in the model, demonstrating a 
significant difference between Costa Rica and Panama. On the surface, the results seem very 
similar with the majority of both countries indicating that this is “very important” for 
conservation of La Amistad.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Shared Conservation Goals” 
 
 “Tourism” was another single variable logistical regression answering the same 
question of “how important is each of these issues in regards to conservation of PILA?” The 
statistical significance is 0.081, which is closer to the cut-off of 0.1 than many of the other 
answers. Nevertheless, coupled with the interviews, there is some difference in the 
perception of the benefits of the park, with Panamanians focusing on the tourism component 
much more frequently than their Costa Rican counterparts.  In the chart below the Costa 
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Rican respondents focus on “very important”, but also have answers across-the-board, while 
in Panama, tourism is at least “somewhat important” with every participant. This 
corroborates the interviews in Panama and the strong opinion that tourism is the main benefit 
of having a neighborhood park. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Tourism” 
 “Are you familiar with the rules and regulations of PILA?” This was asked using a 
Likert scale similar to the other survey questions. This was one of the more unusual answers 
due to the great spread in Costa Rica and a moderate spread in Panama. The statistical 
significance is 0.07 for the logistical regression model, which is close to the cut-off chosen at 
0.1, but the difference in spread is shown below. There appears to be slightly more 
confidence in the familiarity of park regulations in Panama. The greatest threats to the 
Panamanian portion of La Amistad according to an official from ANAM on the Pacific are 
forest fires, development, and infrastructure encroaching on the park, including the 
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hydroelectric projects, the agricultural frontier, and hunting. Recently, the forest fires, 
agricultural frontier, and hunting have been reduced with environmental education.   
 
“The development is provoking a need for more water, services, production 
of more trash, which has advantages and disadvantages. The development 
of infrastructure is a threat. They want to open another road to the 
Caribbean. This is a threat that is there, passive, but if someone in the 
government wants to do it, it will be a problem in the park,” (PaP, 52). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Familiarity with Park Regulations” 
 “Frequency of Collaboration” comes out with a significant difference between Costa 
Rica and Panama when the two questions are combined: “How often do you collaborate with 
other organizations and stakeholders in PILA?” and “Please indicate which organizations 
(MINAE, ANAM) you could collaborate with and how often.” The statistical difference 
when run in the logistical regression model is at 0.142, while each individual question 
received a 0.82. The questions were run separately and did not come up with a significant 
difference. This means that when a logistical regression is fit for both variables, there seems 
to be a significance difference between Costa Rica and Panama. This theme of “Frequency of 
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Collaboration” doesn’t appear to have a significant difference between Costa Rica and 
Panama in separate logistical regressions when there is a better logistical fit for each 
individual question.  
 
 
“Frequency of Collaboration” 
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 There are many factors that could explain the similarities and differences among trust, 
the emergence of collective-choice arrangements, and the existence of polycentric 
governance. These survey questions were one method to explain some of the discrepancies in 
trust and collective-choice arrangements between Costa Rica and Panama. Of the six themes 
that demonstrated statistical significance, or a significant difference between the respondents 
in Costa Rica and the participants in Panama, “Tourism” stands out. In the interviews tourism 
received a more frequent response for park benefits in Panama than Costa Rica. However 
“Community Participation” and “Meaningful Involvement” are not consistent with levels of 
participation of community members. While the majority of respondents found these topics 
of great importance, actual participation levels with the park are much lower than the 
responses for the “Importance of Participation”, which were of high priority. Lastly, the 
perception of frequency of collaboration between the two countries appeared on the charts 
above to be very different, yet the logistical regression did not find the responses very 
statistically different between the two countries. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION   
My research examines the levels of trust, participation or collective action by 
stakeholders, and the development of more polycentric governance across a select number of 
buffer zone communities in the four regions of La Amistad International Park.  With the 
internationally recognized UNESCO Biosphere designation and the Parks in Peril 
recognition, there are interrelated goals of conservation, sustainable development, and 
logistical support. The results of the study show how levels of trust and community member 
involvement in participative governance systems vary across the four regions.  
 These findings demonstrate how local-to-global forces have produced the present 
structure of management at various sociopolitical and geographic scales and reveal some of 
the differences bi-regionally and bi-nationally.  Starting from a human geography 
perspective, La Amistad illustrates Thrift’s (1994) idea that regions are not bound but 
constructed. More specifically, La Amistad is an eco-region that has been constructed and is 
continuously being reconstructed to address numerous agendas. In the realm of 
biogeography, La Amistad is the “single large” conservation solution. The management 
structure mirrors this “single large” approach with top-down centralized management still 
dominating the management of the park, though varying in its hierarchical cohesion across 
the four regions of the park.  
 The idea behind “glocalization” is that there is a unique balance between the 
incorporation of outside support and knowledge and the investment in local customs, 
traditions, and economic vitality. La Amistad does not currently achieve this balance. The 
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unique challenges facing the four separate regions of La Amistad International Park are 
severely impacted both negatively and positively by the relative strength of numerous 
international economic, environmental, and political entities. These accumulating pressures 
have led to more flexibility in the objectives and agendas pursued in the park. This flexibility 
in park regulations is actually creating much tension, especially in Panama with the 
government pursuing economic goals ostensibly under the driver of clean energy. While 
flexibility in regulations for stakeholders can lead to cooperation rather than burdensome 
enforcement, my research questions the value of extensive flexibility being exercised by the 
state, as there can be associated negative impacts. These impacts result in competing attempts 
to construct this region to serve diverse agendas, to the exclusion of conservation, on various 
social and geographic scales.  
 On the international level, there are UNESCO objectives to conserve while 
simultaneously promoting sustainable economic development. The concept of integrated 
conservation and development is one conservation narrative being promoted. Another 
conservation narrative being promoted by the Nature Conservancy is the concept of 
consolidation. On the international level, there are pressures from foreign hydroelectric 
companies and the World Bank to pursue hydroelectric projects. While these projects are 
presented with the environmental justification of “clean energy” and as a measure to combat 
global climate change according to the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, they are also 
initiatives that can be detrimental to the ecosystem and the local communities. On the 
national level, the hydroelectric projects are part of an economic agenda to receive payments 
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for clean energy production. This case study shows the continuous struggle that regions or 
eco-regions have with international pressures from globalization.  
 The hydroelectric issue also illuminates the dynamic nature of regions or eco-regions 
and the importance of understanding and defining spatial extent to successfully manage a 
common pool resource. As Giordano (2003) points out, there are problems in resource 
management when the resource domain and stakeholders do not align.  For a transboundary 
resource with local-to-international stakeholders, the understanding and clearly defined goals 
of the region are of great importance. Ostrom et al. (2002) demonstrates that, with a greater 
geographic extent such as a transboundary resource, analytical deliberation, institutional 
variety, and nesting are three institutional characteristics that may lead to more successful 
common pool resource management.   
 While institutional variety is important, there must be some cooperation and ability 
for local organizations to influence decision-making, in contrast to the situation of “capture” 
as explained by Singleton. The interviews I conducted with Naso community members, my 
analysis of the petition in opposition to the installation of four hydroelectric projects, and my 
participation in a community gathering led by FUNDICCEP, show there is a lack of 
cooperation among the Naso, the state, and the international hydroelectric companies. These 
observations appear to be closer to the idea of “capture” as the Naso requests in the 
hydroelectric agreement with the company and government remain unfulfilled. 
 Spatial extent is also of great importance in the management of a bi-national natural 
resource such as La Amistad, owing to the immense powers of globalization to continuously 
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redefine the regions and spaces. Giordano (2003) has shed light on the spatial implications in 
commons research and the need for congruence between the rights domain and the resource 
domain. This congruence is lacking in La Amistad as the boundaries are pushed and altered 
due to the pressure of the agricultural frontier and the hydroelectric development. Singleton 
(2002) demonstrates that, at larger scales of resource management, the federal government 
cannot be a major player. Ostrom (1998) indicates, “national governments are too small to 
govern the global commons.” La Amistad is a bi-national park that is being reconstructed by 
international stakeholders to meet agendas beyond that of conservation. For example, the 
international hydroelectric companies are stakeholders pursuing hydroelectric projects that 
will provide ‘clean energy’ under the Kyoto Protocol. This is an international power 
redefining the region of La Amistad. 
 With a large spatial extent and global pressures impinging on the park, fortress 
conservation, driven by the state, is not a good match for the regions within La Amistad. In 
particular, this mismatch is evident in the indigenous territory in Panama where there is a 
situation similar to “capture”, with hydroelectric projects in the Naso territory and a faulty 
agreement with the Naso monarch. While there are instances of success when resources are 
available in common pool resource management, “if sufficient resources are made available 
for monitoring and enforcement, such approaches are effective…” (Dietz, Ostrom and Stern, 
2003), La Amistad does not have sufficient resources available in the Caribbean regions of 
the park. The Caribbean regions are also much more geographically extensive, accounting for 
88% of the park area.  
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After following the fortress conservation model to create an immense park system, 
Costa Rica transitioned to reliance on international donations to maintain the park system it 
created. There are more resources available on the Pacific side, with more efforts to civic-
like, as evidenced by the network of community organizations working with sustainable 
development projects in a much smaller region. This dynamic is not observed on the 
Caribbean side. 
 This study looks at the intersection of biogeography and political geography to 
address larger scale and transboundary common pool resources in a case study of a bi-
national park. While the conservation debate of “single large or several small” has many 
advocates of larger eco-regions for biodiversity to flourish, the political side of this argument 
is not supportable. Single large, or fortress conservation, is not a good political match for this 
case. Those advocating a return to fortress conservation tend to dismiss the social and 
political realms of conservation (Wilshusen et al. 2002). The social and political realms are 
of great importance in the conservation of an extensive bi-national park such as La Amistad. 
While decoupling politics from biogeography has mostly been a necessary exercise to 
comprehend the pieces of the world, integrating them more fully is a necessary step to see the 
world we have. According to Caroline Fraser (2010), “Conservation is about managing the 
people. It’s not about managing wildlife.” However, to have a successful management 
regime, some level of trust among stakeholders is necessary but difficult to achieve if 
stakeholders perceive they are being managed. In contrast to traditional fence and fine 
management approaches, more collaborative efforts result when there is a history of 
cooperation (Lubell et al., 2002), which is more likely with higher levels of trust. 
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 Trust  
 The levels of trust among buffer zone community residents and stakeholders, in the 
context of government and other stakeholder conservation efforts in La Amistad, show a 
distinctive variation based on survey and interview responses in Costa Rica and Panama. 
This topic had the largest spread in responses. During the interviews, many Costa Ricans 
from the Pacific side mentioned good relations with the park, no conflicts, and very positive 
sentiments. On the Panamanian side, reacting to current hydroelectric projects, many 
residents associated an opposition to these projects with distrust of the government officials 
in the area, including officials from ANAM, given ANAM’s oversight responsibility for the 
EIA.  
 On the Caribbean side of both Costa Rica and Panama, levels of trust dropped 
dramatically. Many Naso and Bribri expressed distrust and disappointment in the 
management of the park. While many Bribri mentioned past disappointments with the lack of 
support from MINAE, there was enthusiasm for the co-management plan that is developing, 
because it will potentially give the indigenous territory direct involvement in park 
management. Repeated on the Panamanian side was the distrust incited by the hydroelectric 
projects in the buffer zone of the park. 
 The levels of trust vary greatly by region and are affected by many factors. The Red 
Cuercus in Costa Rica has developed a strong relationship with the park and brought the 
community in closer contact with the park administration. There is a sense of companionship 
and “co-responsibility”. On the Caribbean side, the relationship is very strained due to lack of 
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resources and a paucity of NGOs and community associations, which can play a vital role in 
firming up the relationship between the park and the communities affected by the presence of 
the park. The role of the associations in the development of trust between the community 
stakeholders and the park has proven to be very successful and crucial on the Pacific side of 
the park. These same associations also promote collective-choice arrangements. 
 
Collective-choice Arrangements  
 Collective-choice arrangements also vary greatly bi-regionally and bi-nationally. On 
the Pacific side of Costa Rica, 43.7% of the stakeholders interviewed (those who felt that 
they are positively or negatively affected by the park) do not participate in any manner with 
the park. In Panama, 44.4% of the stakeholders in the buffer zone communities do not 
participate in any substantive way. This highlights a gap in stakeholder participation and 
problems in entraining stakeholders in collaborative efforts.  There are formal mechanisms of 
participation, with help from the Nature Conservancy, through the Consejo Local and the 
Program of Monitoring and Effectiveness. However,these organizations invite certain parties, 
but exclude other stakeholders. The methods of participation promoted by the Nature 
Conservancy are not only exclusive, rather than participatory, but are only assessment tools 
rather than decision-making tools. The actual influence of these assessment tools is unknown. 
To include more stakeholders and have more of a collective-choice arrangement, it is 
necessary to close this gap and find ways of including more stakeholders in the process. On 
paper, the assessment tools promoted by the Nature Conservancy demonstrate strides towards 
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collective-choice arrangements, while in reality these methods have more of the appearance 
of a government formality.  
 Based on interviews on the Caribbean side of the park, both Naso and Bribri 
expressed sentiments of exclusion from the management of the park and, particularly, 
exclusion of their indigenous knowledge and traditional forms of managing the park. 
Tensions still exist as the MINAE and ANAM regulations are carried out in these reserves, as 
there is no formal means of participation at this point. The co-management plan with the 
Bribri may help transform this region into a more participatory management scheme. 
However, the Caribbean side of Panama has a very rigid hierarchy and I am not aware of 
attempts directed at more stakeholder involvement, especially with the tension stemming 
from the hydroelectric project on the Bonyick River adjacent to the reserve. 
 
Polycentric Governance  
 In introducing nested enterprises and polycentric governance, La Amistad 
International Park has demonstrated some form of co-assessment or co-responsibility and 
more inclusion of the buffer zone communities. The creation of a co-management 
arrangement is in the discussion phase between the Bribri and MINAE.  While La Amistad is 
a UNESCO Biosphere with integrated development opportunities in the buffer zone, the 
management structure still more closely follows the traditional, fortress approach to 
conservation, with a very hierarchical regime that exists in all four regions of the park, 
especially on the Caribbean side of La Amistad. As demonstrated in Chart VIII, there are 
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numerous funding streams into the Pacific of Costa Rica and Panama. The Atlantic side of 
the park in both Costa Rica and Panama does not receive as much financial attention. 
 On the Pacific side of Costa Rica, there is evidence of participation and decision-
making by the Red Cuercus and the associations involved in this network. One association 
leader described their role as “co-responsibility”. The influence of the Red Cuercus is strong 
and they are involved in many of the conservation projects in the buffer zones. In Panama, 
the network of ADATA, and especially the NGO known as FUNDICCEP, is using the power 
and influence they have to combat hydroelectric dams and rally the communities. Both the 
Red Cuercus and ADATA are powerful local groups that provide another layer of 
governance. These organizations collaborate and work with their respective governmental 
agencies, MINAE and ANAM, to bring stakeholder involvement to the forefront by securing 
grants for conservation projects, rallying the communities to combat hydroelectric dams, 
promoting environmental education, and implementing monitoring programs in the park. 
 Global and national sources of funding are not readily available on the Caribbean side 
of the park and, consequently, this region lags in sustainable development projects and 
alternative socio-economic approaches. There are few, strong NGOs or associations to 
mediate and encourage collaborative interactions between the park and the community. The 
indigenous territories exhibit a unique form of polycentric governance. There are local 
groups, the Junta de Vecinos in the Bribri territory and the park rangers for the ADITIBRI 
government who issue timber permits, hunting permits and carry out the laws of ANAM. 
However, they are not involved in the decision-making. They are the enforcers of the laws 
that were externally imposed on their communities, in accordance with a centralized 
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management scheme. Additionally, major decisions affecting  the park and the hydroelectric 
dams in the buffer zones are made in central government offices.  
 On the Panamanian side, there is some financial support coming for local Naso 
sustainable development initiatives through organizations like ODESEN and Corredor 
Biologico. These efforts are successfully facilitating tourist visits to the park at the Wekso 
Station and within the community of Bonyick. The community leaders did not mention any 
collaboration or financial support from international organizations. The degree of local 
decision-making is hard to decipher. A strict, hierarchical style of management made it 
difficult to find a park official willing to be interviewed and left this researcher with the 
strong impression that polycentric governance is not emerging on the Caribbean side of La 
Amistad in Panama.  
 
Limitations  
 Due to time and fiscal restraints, my thesis research project consisted of one brief 
preliminary trip to La Amistad International Park in the summer of 2011, followed by a 39-
day field expedition in January and February of 2011 covering the four provinces that 
constitute the park. My research certainly could be advanced with a longer field expedition 
with more field observations, interviews, and surveys in each community. Several 
communities had as few as two days dedicated to field research. Many NGO workers were 
unavailable for interviews and more time in the field would allow for more connections and 
flexibility in the interview process.  
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 Other limitations involved the research restrictions for La Amistad in the Bocas del 
Toro Province. Numerous emails and phone calls were made prior to the visit to schedule a 
meeting with an ANAM official in La Amistad on the Caribbean side, to no avail. Through 
other contacts I learned of a formal process to conduct research on this side of the park. I 
initiated the process but never received a response. I went in person to the ANAM office in 
Changuinola multiple times to encourage this process, without success. Through a contact in 
ANAM, I was able to secure a meeting with the park administrator of La Amistad in Bocas 
del Toro, but at the meeting I was informed that he we would not discuss anything without 
the “formal procedures” being followed. I was able to conduct interviews with the two other 
park administrators, as well as other functionaries and park rangers on the Pacific and 
Caribbean sides of Costa Rica and the Pacific side of Panama.  
 In interviews using the audio recorder, there was a lot of hesitation from women. I 
always asked for consent, but many female participants gave very brief, subdued answers, 
several stating that they felt uncomfortable with the audio recorder. Overall, most community 
members whom I asked for interviews were very willing to help. 
 During my visit to the Bribri indigenous reserve, my translator was an ADITIBRI 
park ranger. I was not informed of this until after the completion of interviews and surveys. 
He mentioned I was receiving more positive results on attitudes toward the park due to his 
presence and that the lifestyle situation for many of these families is very rough with the park 
restrictions. My translator mentioned that some of the concepts I was describing to him in 
Spanish were difficult to explain in Bribri. The park ranger said he did his best to explain but 
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did admit some difficulty, so some of the questions in the interviews and surveys might have 
been misinterpreted.  
 
Potential for Future Research 
 
 There is potential for future research in a variety of subject areas. One area  to pursue  
is monitoring the evolution of the hydroelectric projects and observing how these projects 
affect the relationship between the community stakeholders and government officials, such as 
ANAM. Monitoring the levels of trust, the participation or collective-choice arrangements, 
and the dynamic of the nested enterprises will further elucidate regional dynamics and the 
possibilities for change. Even with the amount of public dissent on a local to international 
level that currently exists, La Amistad International Park has not been assigned World 
Heritage Sites “in danger” status, which would lead to mitigating action. It would be 
interesting to look at the external pressures from the World Bank and other organizations to 
build these hydroelectric dams and the impacts the dams are projected to have on the local 
communities. Is glocalization occurring with communities having the option to embrace 
and/or reject values and ideas, or is globalization altering the local landscapes without the 
support of these buffer zone communities? 
 A more in-depth investigation of why tourism has been identified in Panama as the 
most important reason for preserving La Amistad, while clean air and water have been 
identified as the most important reasons in Costa Rica for preserving La Amistad La Amistad 
would be illuminating.  Both regions discussed the success of their environmental education 
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programs, but their perspectives on the benefits of conservation are very different. Does this 
lead back to environmental education? The different government programs in the area, with 
the example of hydroelectric projects in Panama? Differences in economic benefits of the 
park? Does this explain why the park limitations are much more fluid in Panama than in 
Costa Rica, as the agricultural frontier continues to challenge the boundaries? 
 The co-management plan between MINAE and ADITIBRI is being processed. Once 
the plan is implemented, it will be instructive to see whether indigenous knowledge and 
management practices are incorporated and whether there is cooperation between the two 
groups, or if this is a situation of “capture” in which the management will continue in the 
mode of “business-as-usual”, with a top-down agenda and control.  
 Lastly, there is much survey data that were significant from a logistical regression 
standpoint. The themes with a significant difference between Costa Rica and Panama 
respondents (P<0.1) included “Community Participation”, “Meaningful Involvement”, 
“Shared Conservation Goals”, “Tourism”, “Familiarity with Park Regulations”, and 
“Frequency of Collaboration”, based on input from both the park and local associations. 
Further investigation into the nature of these differences and their significance should lead to 
additional insights. Future work would also benefit from a larger sample and a broader range 
of people and organizations. 
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Conclusion   
 The portrayal of La Amistad International Park by governments and international 
organizations (e.g., UNESCO and the Nature Conservancy), as well as in guidebooks, is that 
of a single, large, unified, protected “friendship” park. My research demonstrates that, 
instead of one geography, underlying this depiction, there is a variety of governance 
geographies where there is tension between the interests of communities and the government. 
This was especially prominent in the Panamanian provinces of the park due to the installation 
of hydroelectric projects. There are divisions across La Amistad, both geographically due to 
the presence of the Talamanca Mountains and politically because of significant variance in 
management approaches across the four provincial boundaries. These differences in 
management practices result in variations in degrees of citizen participation and levels of 
trust among stakeholders. While organizations, such as the Nature Conservancy, pursue 
initiatives of “consolidation”, La Amistad’s geographies of governance present many 
challenges associated with its large expanse and the different management approaches 
currently implemented throughout the park. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Acronyms 
 
ACD- Alliance for Conservation and Development 
ADATA- La Alianza Para el Desarrollo Ambiental de Tierras Altas 
ADITIBRI- Asociación de Desarrollo Integral del Territorio Indígena Bribri de Talamanca 
AMISCONDE- La Amistad, Conservación y Desarrollo 
ANAM- La Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente 
ASAELA- Asociación Agroecoturística La Amistad 
ASOMOBI- Asociación de Mujeres Organizadas de Biolley 
ASOPROLA- Asociación de Productores La Amistad 
CATIE- Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza 
CIDH- Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
FUNDICCEP-  Fundación Para el Desarrollo Integral, Comunitario y Conservación de los 
ecosistemas en Panamá 
MINAE- Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía 
ODESEN- Organización de Desarrollo Sostenible y Ecoturismo Naso 
PIP- Parks in Peril 
SINAC- Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación 
SINAP- Sistema Nacional de Áreas Protegidas  
TNC- The Nature Conservancy 
WCD- World Commission on Dams 
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Semi-Structured Interview Questions for Community Members 
 
 I am Lauren, a student from Western Washington University in the US. I am doing research 
on the management and governance of La Amistad International Park. I am looking for 
information about the management network between the organizations and local, national 
and international groups and their participation in the decision making of the park, the 
activities in the park and the influence and power of each of these groups. 
 
1.) For how long have you been in…? 
 
2.) What sorts of activities do you do daily? 
 
3.) Has your day-to-day life changed with the management changes in La Amistad? 
Have you maintained the same lifestyle? 
If not, what kinds of changes? 
 
4.) Have there been any limitations or constraints due the rules and regulations of La 
Amistad? 
Have there been challenges or benefits from the park? 
 
5.) Do you participate in park decision-making? 
Attend meetings, conferences, talks? 
Do you work with or have any direct contact with any local conservation 
organizations?  
National organizations?  
International organizations?  
 
6.) What kind of relationship do you have with park rangers or other park officials? 
Have you had any conflict with park regulations?  
Or park rangers?  
Are there any regulations you do not approve of? 
            
  
7.) If you want to change something about the park who would you turn to? Or if you 
have any grievances, who do you go to? Who fixed any problems? 
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Semi-Structured Interview Questions for NGO works, Park Officials 
 
 
First I ask that you start with an introduction of your role in the park, what type of 
work and a little about the park and the management of PILA.  
 
1.) What types of problems exist in conservation in this region? 
 Can you specify in order of importance? 
 How do you confront those difficulties? 
 Are there transboundary problems? Worries? If yes, How do you deal with 
 those? 
2.) Where does the majority of the funding come from for the projects you work on? 
Local? National? Internantional? 
 Who decides where the funds go? 
 Who participates in the decision? 
3.) With what other group or organizations do you collaborate? 
 Local? National? International? 
 How frequently or how many times per year are there collaborations?  
 What types of projects? 
4.) How are the collaborations between Costa Rica and Panama? Between the Caribbean 
and the Pacific sides of the park? Between the park and the communities? 
 Are there barriers or limitations to collaboration? What are they? 
5.) Finally, I’d like to know the level of autonomy this organization has, or how much 
influence on the management of PILA.  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Survey Questions  
1. What type of work do you do? What type of organization do you work for?  
 
2. Where is this organization located? 
 
3. In your opinion, how important is each of these issues in regards to conservation of PILA? 
 Very 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
May or may not 
be Important 
Not very 
Important 
Not Important 
Shared conservation goals 
among stakeholders 
     
Enforcement of 
governmental legislation 
     
Public participation with 
meaningful involvement 
     
Funding      
Collaboration among 
stakeholders 
     
Tourism      
Trust and transparency 
among stakeholders 
     
 
4. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements.  In terms of conservation efforts in PILA: 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
May or May 
Not Agree 
Do not 
Agree 
Strongly Do 
Not Agree 
Community involvement plays a 
significant role. 
     
The public should be involved in the 
decision-making processes. 
     
We need more avenues for public 
participation in decision-making. 
     
People are generally trustworthy and 
honest. 
     
Citizens trust the government.      
Citizens feels that they can have 
meaningful involvement in decision-
making. 
     
 
5. Are you familiar with the rules and regulations of PILA? 
Very Familiar Somewhat Familiar Neither Not Very Familiar Not Familiar At All 
     
 
6. Do you support the rules and regulations of PILA? 
  152 
Strongly Support Support Neither Do not Support Strongly Do Not Support 
     
 
7. How often do you collaborate with other organizations and stakeholders in PILA? 
Very often Often Sometimes Not Very Often Not At All 
     
 
8. Please indicate which organizations you collaborate with and how often. 
 Very often Often Sometimes Not Very Often Not At All 
MINAE, SINAC      
ANAM      
Local NGOs      
National NGOs      
International NGOs      
 
Please list organizations that you collaborate with “very often” and “often”. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Please list organizations that fall under a separate category not listed above. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Survey Results Costa Rica vs. Panama 
 
 
Question 3: In your opinion, how important is each of these issues in regards to conservation 
of PILA? 
 
 
Costa Rica 
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 154 
Panama 
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Question 4: Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. In terms 
of conversation efforts of PILA: 
 
 
Costa Rica 
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Panama 
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Question 5: Are you familiar with the rules and regulations of PILA? 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 6: Do you support the rules and regulations of PILA? 
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Question 7: How often do you collaborate with other organizations and stakeholders in 
PILA? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 8: Please indicate which organizations (MINAE, SINAC) you collaborate with and 
how often.  
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Logistical Regression Results for Survey Questions Costa Rica vs. Panama 
Significant if P<0.1 
 
“Community Participation”    
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model 10.942 3 .012 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
Community involvement plays a significant  
role 
16.993 13777.581 .999 
The public should be involved in the decision- 
making process 
1.311 .730 .073 
We need more avenues for public participation  
in decision-making 
.801 .536 .135 
 
 
“Trust”    
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model .880 2 .644 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
People are generally trustworthy and honest .101 .226 .655 
Citizens trust the government .139 .190 .466 
 
 
“Meaningful Involvement”    
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model 11.062 1 .001 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
Citizens feel that they can have meaningful 
Involvement in decision-making 
1.489 .605 .014 
 
 
“Importance of Collaboration”    
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model 1.238 2 .539 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
Public participation with meaningful  .522 .528 .323 
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involvement 
Collaboration among stakeholders -.424 .504 .400 
 
“Importance of Trust and Transparency”    
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model .560 1 .454 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
Trust and transparency among stakeholders .483 .670 .471 
 
 
“Support of conservation legislation”    
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model 3.703 2 .157 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
Enforcement of governmental legislation -.505 .299 .092 
Do you support the rules and regulations of  
PILA? 
-.174 .241 .472 
 
 
“Shared Conservation Goals”    
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model 5.653 1 .017 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
Shared conservation goals among stakeholders -.896 .427 .036 
 
 
“Funding”    
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model 1.457 1 .227 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
Funding -.230 .217 .231 
 
 
“Tourism”    
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Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model 3.041 1 .081 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
Tourism .539 .363 .138 
 
“Familiarity with Park Regulations”    
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model 3.275 1 .070 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
Are you familiar with the rules and regulations  
of PILA? 
.330 .189 .080 
 
 
“Frequency of Collaboration”    
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model 3.901 2 .142 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
How often do you collaborate with other 
Organizations and stakeholders in PILA? 
-.519 .298 .082 
Please indicate which organizations  
(MINAE, ANAM)you collaborate with and  
how often. 
.397 .228 .082 
 
 
“Frequency of Collaboration with Local  
Associations” 
   
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
Model .510 1 .475 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
How often do you collaborate with other 
Organizations and stakeholders in PILA? 
-.131 .185 .477 
 
  
“Frequency of Collaboration with Park”    
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients Chi-square df Sig. 
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Model .535 1 .464 
    
Variables in the Equation B S.E. Sig. 
Please indicate which organizations  
(MINAE, ANAM)you collaborate with  
and how often.  
.102 .140 .465 
  
